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“ACCOUNTABILITY” AS “LEGITIMACY”: 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
Kenneth Anderson* 
INTRODUCTION: THREE VARIETIES OF NGO ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER 
GLOBALIZATION 
 contested issue of globalization is the question of whether, how, 
and to what extent an economically integrating world requires a 
politically integrated planet—a world that has a global law, regulation, 
and enforcement that transcends all lesser political authority and to 
which all other political entities must cede their sovereignty.1 A federal 
world, a world under a global constitution—loosely configured of neces-
sity, naturally, but nonetheless one in which international law establishes 
a distinct hierarchy under which the sovereignty of individual states must 
necessarily give way. 
For many, such a politically integrated world is morally and politically 
desirable on its own terms. It is moral progress as such. For others, the 
justification for political integration is because it is presumably a neces-
sary corollary of global economic integration—a matter of global welfare 
and justice, but also of global economic efficiency on its own terms. This 
amounts to a descriptive causal claim that political integration is driven 
by material economic factors of economic integration and conducive to 
them, the necessary political economy of an integrated global market. 
The fact of a world in which economies are coming together among 
economic actors, such as multinational business enterprises that are able 
                                                                                                                            
 *   Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University; Visiting 
Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and Non-resident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institu-
tion. Parts of this draft are taken from the forthcoming book, Living with the UN: Ameri-
can Responsibilities and International Order (2011), as well as a book chapter in GIVING 
WELL: THE ETHICS OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY (Patricia Illingworth, Thomas Pogge, & 
Leif Wenar eds., 2010). I am grateful for comments from participants in the Brooklyn 
Law School Symposium, Governing Civil Society: NGO Accountability, Legitimacy, and 
Influence; the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, whose members offered 
comments on an early draft; University of Virginia Law School, which offered a visiting 
professor a congenial place to complete this Essay; and my law school dean, Claudio 
Grossman, for the support of Washington College of Law in my scholarly research. Fi-
nally, thanks particularly to Steve Krasner for conversations on the concept of legitimacy.  
 1. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic Globalization, in GOVERNANCE 
IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 347 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000) (discuss-
ing a global federalism to enable the formation of a fully integrated international econo-
my). 
A
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to act across national political borders, gives, according to many, ever 
greater urgency to building what has been called “global governance.”2 
An economically integrating world requires mechanisms of accountabili-
ty for those economic actors, which must perforce be regulating political 
institutions—but which themselves stand in need of mechanisms of ac-
countability. 
That is on the side of the ledger of public international law and institu-
tions under globalization. At the same time, since the end of the Cold 
War in 1990, there has been unprecedented growth of international non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and transborder social move-
ments, drawing in large numbers of people around the world.3 The place 
of NGOs in this globalizing world also poses questions, particularly as 
they take up political activities at the global, and not merely national, 
level. To take up global political activities presupposes global actors with 
which to have political intercourse. The influence, reach, presence, and 
power of these international NGOs have grown fantastically in the past 
two decades, and they pose questions about for whom they speak—on 
anyone’s behalf rather than their own? To whom are they accountable for 
the positions they advocate, and does it matter? Do they represent anyone 
other than themselves? Should states and international organizations pay 
particular attention to them, and if so, why and how? Who, if anyone, 
should be accountable to them, and in what ways? 
The Brooklyn Symposium to which this Essay is a contribution made 
particular note of two different meanings of the “accountability” of 
NGOs. Each meaning is important, indispensable even, but they are not 
the same thing. To those two, I add a third, by way of introduction. 
First, NGOs are institutions that offer greater or lesser degrees of ac-
countability in an “internal” sense—an internal “governance” sense. In 
other words, the accountability that would be relevant to any organiza-
tion in its fiduciary governance, but particularly fiduciary institutions of 
a nonprofit nature that also owe obligations of public trust. These obliga-
tions of accountability include, to start with, mechanisms to account for 
the stewardship of funds, fidelity to the mission for which those funds 
were conveyed, and the range of often quite technical accountability is-
sues that go along with the classic fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, as 
well as (in the case of a charitable organization) some duty of transpa-
rency. 
                                                                                                                            
 2. See generally Hakan Altinay, Global Governance: A Work in Progress, YALE 
GLOBAL ONLINE (Jan. 26, 2010), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/altinay.jsp. 
 3. For the best-known account from the 1990s, see MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1998). 
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These “internal” forms of accountability ensure stewardship of re-
sources toward a mission, and they can be satisfied—indeed, really can 
only be satisfied—through expert and technical ministration by auditors, 
accountants, lawyers, and others. There is a further important question, 
as papers in the Brooklyn Symposium note in detail,4 as to whom those 
“internal accountability” monitors should themselves be accountable. For 
example, in the transborder NGO arena, to which country’s regulators 
must monitors answer? Those giving aid assistance, or those receiving it, 
or both? Since presumably no one favors embezzlement of NGO funds, 
and more broadly everyone favors accountability in the sense of steward-
ship toward a declared mission, this form of accountability is largely in-
strumental and not contested, even if the role of the government regulator 
raises important questions of political governance in a world in which 
NGOs cross borders. 
A second form of accountability, however, might be thought of as “ex-
ternal” accountability. It is explicitly about the relationship of NGOs to 
the globalized world in a political sense—the accountability of their role 
as political actors, both to whom they ought to be accountable, and who 
ought to be accountable to them—in each instance an open and contested 
question. This is the question of whether NGOs claim, and by some actor 
are conveyed, a role in political governance of a kind that hithertofor 
might have thought to attach to governments and their governed peoples. 
If, as has often been claimed during the last twenty or so years, NGOs act 
as “stand in” representatives of the “peoples” of the world before interna-
tional organizations, in what sense and to whom are they accountable, if 
they now stand alongside or supplant states in this role? And in what 
sense are these international organizations to account to NGOs, why, on 
what basis, and what principle of justification, if at all? 
This Essay addresses itself to this second, “external,” sense of accoun-
tability. As a consequence, it does not focus very much on the first sense 
of accountability, in large part because it is in agreement that the first 
sense of accountability is crucial and indisputable as a proposition, even 
if there is much useful discussion to be had as to forms. Mechanisms to 
enforce the basic rules of internal fiduciary accountability are essential 
for any organization, for profit, non-profit, or governmental alike. Whe-
reas the most contested issues for cross-border NGOs and accountability 
at this moment arise from this second sense, the political, external sense 
of accountability, without in any way slighting the enormous importance 
                                                                                                                            
 4. Symposium, Governing Civil Society: NGO Accountability, Legitimacy, and In-
fluence, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 813 (2011). 
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of the often highly technical work around the standards, rules, regula-
tions, laws, and best practices for internal accountability. 
Yet at least in passing, note that there is a third question of accounta-
bility that has not received sufficient attention. It particularly attaches to 
those NGOs taking human rights and such “values” issues as their sub-
ject matter—those NGOs devoted to questions of international morality, 
whether framed as human rights law, politics, or some other way. This 
third question of accountability asks whether (and if so under what cir-
cumstances) an NGO actor making pronouncements and offering judg-
ments of law and morality (judgments, for example, on the law of war 
applied to terrorism situations, or calls for forcible humanitarian inter-
vention by states or international governmental organizations) should be 
called to “account” for its judgments, given that it has no “skin in the 
game.” One way in which human rights NGOs, in particular—though it 
can be seen to extend to other issues and NGOs as well—might be de-
scribed as “unaccountable” is the relative ease with which entities with 
no direct stake may call for others to act.5 It is natural, irresistible even, 
to ask to whom “accountability” is owed by the NGO that is responsible 
for the safety of no population, no territory, has no governance responsi-
bilities and yet freely calls for many sweeping things, including the ex-
penditure of blood and treasure. God? Kant? The Categorical Impera-
tive? 
Yet, with respect to this third question of accountability, when the fail-
ure to have a stake in the outcome should be regarded as an accountabili-
ty liability is a vexed question in jurisprudence and ethics. After all, there 
                                                                                                                            
 5. I raised this third issue of accountability while drafting a blog post at Opinio Juris 
and received a comment to the effect that human rights organizations sometimes do have 
“skin in the game”—monitors at risk in various situations and countries who might be 
attacked, etc. Kenneth Anderson, Conceptualizing Accountability in International Law 
and Institutions, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 25, 2011, 10:42 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/02/25/conceptualizing-accountability-in-international-law-
and-institutions/; BH, Response, Kenneth Anderson, Conceptualizing Accountability in 
International Law and Institutions, OPINIO JURIS, (Feb. 26, 2011, 8:44 PM) 
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/02/25/conceptualizing-accountability-in-international-law-
and-institutions/. That is of course sometimes true, but it is not quite what I mean by 
“skin in the game” here. To be clear, the kind of skin in the game that matters for the 
kinds of sweeping things sometimes urged, seemingly quite cavalierly, by human rights 
organizations is not simply having personnel at risk; it is having whole populations and 
societies at stake, the commonweal as such, the kinds of stakes that force one to weigh 
one’s moral seriousness in concrete relation to one’s fiduciary obligations to those one 
governs as a state and its leaders. This is a much larger topic than either this Essay or this 
footnote can address, but it seems to me important, in laying out the varieties of accoun-
tability at issue for NGOs, to put it squarely on the table, even if it is not here pursued 
further. 
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seems to be something rather too easy about a human rights NGO so-
lemnly instructing governments in their duties while sitting in the com-
fortable position of the “kibitzer” who has nothing at stake. At the same 
time, however, in many situations, for equally compelling instincts about 
morality and the rule of law, we do not want the actors who pronounce 
duties to have anything directly at stake—judges, for example, for whom 
having no skin in the game is a sine qua non of the rule of law. 
There are important observations one could make about why judges are 
not to have stakes in the matters they judge, while still being critical of 
the too-easy claims of NGOs—starting with the way in which judges are 
connected directly to the second question of accountability raised above, 
a connection with the state, the impartial judiciary as an embedded part 
of a state that does have the commonweal as its moral and political obli-
gation. But this Essay leaves aside this important and difficult issue, and 
limits itself to a consideration of the second, which is to say the “exter-
nal”: the connection between legitimacy and global governance, NGOs 
and public international organizations. 
What follows suggests that these two actors and issues—global gover-
nance, through institutions of the United Nations, and international 
NGOs and their global role—are deeply interlinked. What links them is 
the question of legitimacy, which is to say, the quality of a political order 
to be able to act with the broad and largely unquestioning support of its 
members. At stake in this debate over legitimacy, the UN, and interna-
tional NGOs is the question of whether global governance—one over-
arching lawgiver for the planet, a constitution for the world, the liberal 
internationalist dream of replacing interstate power politics with the rule 
of international law and institutions—is a desirable or even possible 
thing.6 And whether, in this account of global governance, international 
NGOs, and transborder social movements more generally, have any spe-
cial governance role to play. 
The conclusion of this Essay is a skeptical one. The skepticism is more 
than just the customary realist skepticism that this governance role is 
easy to achieve or is in fact coming to pass. The most important skeptic-
ism offered by this Essay is one grounded in idealism, not realism. That 
is to say, it is skeptical, on the one hand, of the desirability of global go-
vernance as conceived by global elites, including those in international 
NGOs as well as in public international organizations. And it is especial-
ly skeptical, on the other hand, of the proposed role for international 
                                                                                                                            
 6. Drawing on Francis Fukuyama’s useful characterization of liberal international-
ism. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AFTER THE NEOCONS: AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS 7 (2006). 
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NGOs on the global stage in promoting and legitimating global gover-
nance. 
This Essay argues that international NGOs lack the capacity in accoun-
tability, representativeness, and political intermediation to carry out the 
legitimation functions that one prevailing, prominent account of global 
governance gives them, whether forthrightly or, on account of criticism 
such as that of this Essay, sotto voce. The argument of this Essay is that 
public international organizations and international NGOs engage in a 
mutually congenial but quite circular act of “auto-legitimation,” each to 
the other. Each believes itself importantly “legitimated” in this process—
so enhancing, each in its view, its authority in the international commu-
nity. 
The sense of this Essay is that this circle of auto-legitimation, each for 
the other, is rather too small to increase actual legitimacy or authority in 
the world, and that it has a deeply unfortunate consequence for the ac-
countability of each. In other words, each of these institutions treats these 
acts of mutual legitimation as forms of accountability, accounting to each 
other in what each sees as a check-and-balance on the other, but which 
appears to the skeptical outsider as a positive feedback cycle upwards of 
mutually bestowed “legitimacy” and ever more imaginary “accountabili-
ty.” 
I. UNFREEZING THE NGOS AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
IN THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
To understand the gradual evolution of the relationship between public 
international institutions and international NGOs and transnational social 
movements, let us go back a little—not very much, for these purposes—
in the history of each. The post-WWII period saw the founding of the 
United Nations in 19457 and with it the reemergence of transnational 
nongovernmental organizations and social movements that had been 
largely frozen, dissipated, or destroyed by the war and attendant changes. 
These organizations played a part in the San Francisco meetings that led 
to the UN Charter. Indeed, the Charter makes explicit, if passing, refer-
ence to them as consulting organizations.8 Yet the tensions and ideologi-
cal divisions of the Cold War meant that the role of transnational NGOs 
was subordinated to the struggle between the two superpowers as well as 
                                                                                                                            
 7. BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (2004). 
 8. The Charter of the United Nations, Article 71, provides that “[t]he Economic and 
Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental 
organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.” U.N. Charter art. 
71. 
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the gradually emerging non-aligned movement at the UN, anti-colonialist 
and post-colonialist coalitions within the UN General Assembly and its 
attendant agencies.9 During the 1950s through the 1980s, large-scale so-
cial movements developed; to some degree, these social movements tran-
scended borders, and likewise the organizations supporting them.10 Many 
of these movements had to do with peace and disarmament and anti-
nuclear weapons campaigns; by the 1970s, these had started seriously to 
develop into the genuinely transnational movement for human rights, the 
environment, women’s rights and issues, and the other social movements 
that are most familiar to us today and which, to some degree, have sup-
planted the most traditional and oldest concern of transnational social 
movements—international peace.11 This account notably runs together 
transnational NGOs with social movements; the latter are by their nature 
larger movements of people who might or might not express themselves 
through NGOs, while the former are actual organizations, although orga-
nized and run in a wide variety of institutional ways.12 
The social and cultural shifts that led to a redefinition of NGOs in the 
1990s actually began in the 1970s, in part with the development of new 
social movements, but in large part with the growth of the institutional 
human rights movement and the international environmental movement. 
The emergence of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, with their nearly off-
hand reference to human rights, in retrospect turned out to have given 
birth to many of the human rights monitoring and advocacy NGOs that 
today are taken almost for granted.13 What the Helsinki reference to hu-
man rights did, in the context of a mid-Cold War document, was give 
NGOs an implied legitimacy in matters of politics, power, diplomacy, 
and basic existence and voice. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986 
created tragic and dangerous circumstances that allowed ordinary people 
to take advantage of the new-found legitimacy of citizens’ groups, even 
                                                                                                                            
 9. I am pleased to see that this account largely agrees with the new and outstanding 
history of the human rights movement found in SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA (2010). 
 10. See, e.g., History of Organization: NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1963/red-cross-history.html (last vi-
sited May 17, 2011). 
 11. See, e.g., NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY (Enrique Lara-
na, Hank Johnston & Joseph R. Gusfield eds., 1994); David Plotke, What’s So New About 
New Social Movements?, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CRITIQUES, CONCEPTS, CASE STUDIES 
113 (Stanford M. Lyman ed., 1995) [hereinafter SOCIAL MOVEMENTS]. 
 12. See Stanford M. Lyman, Social Theory and Social Movements: Sociology as So-
ciodicy, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 11, at 397. 
 13. For the U.S. Department of State’s explanation of the Helsinki Final Act (1975), 
see Office of the Historian, Helsinki Final Act, 1975, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/Helsinki (last visited May. 16, 2011). 
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within a communist regime and internationally among their global coun-
terparts. And it accelerated the movement toward the legitimacy of inter-
national NGOs, not just in human rights matters, but in environmental 
issues, as well.14 The spillover radiation effects upon Western and East-
ern Europe of a nuclear reactor disaster in communist Russia15 focused 
much attention on the cross-border effects of environmental problems, 
further empowering the idea of cross-border NGOs. 
The recursive legitimacy of transborder NGOs that arose from these 
historical events has gradually turned into a genie that authoritarian re-
gimes have been seeking to keep bottled up ever since, as attest the mas-
sive efforts of China, for example, to police the ability of NGOs inside 
and outside China to utilize the Internet.16 The UN Charter makes refer-
ence to transnational NGOs as a source of advice and expertise,17 but the 
Helsinki Accords implies a political legitimacy that hints, however obli-
quely and, really, only in historical retrospect, at a seat at the table of 
governance. The fact that this legitimacy arose in the context of human 
rights rather than other leading values of the UN—peace and security, or 
economic development and relief of global poverty, for example—gave 
an absolutist moral tenor to the NGO movement. Human rights, after all, 
are matters of rights, at least in principle, not matters of social tradeoffs; 
and those who advocate for them, according to the narrative, thus have a 
similar absolute right to be heard and take part. It was a short ideological 
step to add that this meant a right to participate in governance concerning 
these issues, which is to say, participation in governance about every-
thing, because what does not have a connection to human rights? 
The human rights advocates that emerged as global players in that 
era—Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, in particular—
saw themselves as accountable to no government or, really, any other 
authority.18 On the contrary, governments in moral theory if not political 
                                                                                                                            
 14. See, e.g., ZHORES A. MEDVEDEV, THE LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL (1992) (retelling 
the story of the Chernobyl accident to shed light on the facts and misinformation that 
have been used to serve state and institutional interests). 
 15. 3 CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 170–71 (15th ed. 
2005). 
 16. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE COMPLICITY 
IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP (2006), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/. 
 17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 18. One relatively neutral journalistic account of the rise of the modern human rights 
movement—meaning, an account not merely hagiographic—is KIRSTEN SELLARS, THE 
RISE AND RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). For a semi-anthropological account—a social 
scientist observing from the inside—of the interior culture of Amnesty International, 
including its many tensions and conflicts, see STEPHEN HOPGOOD, KEEPERS OF THE 
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fact, ought to account for their behavior to them. At the same time, they 
saw themselves as having global moral authority, as it were, derived as 
guardians and trustees of Kant’s categorical moral imperative.19 In this 
they exhibited a certain peculiar echo reaching clear back to the ancient 
moral claims of the Church in early Europe, as the voice of God against 
“mere” temporal authority.20 
Yet the 1980s was also a highly contradictory political period. On the 
one hand, human rights advocates made common cause with the US gov-
ernment in opposition to communist oppression in the Soviet empire 
(without, however, actually denouncing socialism as an economic sys-
tem). On the other hand, they sharply attacked the US government for its 
Central American policies and proxy wars that were, after all (and as the 
rising American neoconservatives pointed out), fundamentally aimed at 
rolling back communist expansionism. From the standpoint of human 
rights advocates, this was moral consistency in an exemplary fashion—
the application of common human rights standards without exception. 
From the standpoint of American conservatives of the day, such as the 
Reagan administration UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, this amounted 
to application of a purely formal and sterile consistency that resulted, in 
fact, in an insidious double standard.21 The double standard consisted in 
the appearance of formal, equal treatment of all regimes, but with the 
objective result of undermining admittedly authoritarian but pro-Western 
dictators (who might, in theory at least, eventually be reformable) in fa-
vor of totalitarian dictators and Communist regimes (which, in theory as 
well as fact, would not be reformed, at least not as totalitarian, Commun-
ist regimes).22 
Throughout all of this, however, the UN was still not the focal point of 
the rising human rights NGOs. The UN was still caught in the paralysis 
of the Cold War and ideals of the self-determination of peoples, not “in-
dividual” human rights. The idea of global structures to govern the world 
through international law seemed madly utopian, given two superpowers 
were locked in global struggle. The UN mattered, principally, to the in-
                                                                                                                            
FLAME: UNDERSTANDING AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2006). For a brief review of it, from 
the standpoint of someone who has worked inside Human Rights Watch, a similarly si-
tuated organization, see Kenneth Anderson, Book Review, 30 INT’L HIST. REV. 911 
(2008). 
 19. See generally, IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
19–51 (Mary Gregor, ed. & trans., 1998). 
 20. For a critical take on this tendency, see Kenneth Anderson, Secular Eschatologies 
and Class Interests of the Internationalized New Class, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
COMPETING CLAIMS? 107, 110, 113 (Peter Juviler & Carrie Gustafson eds., 1998). 
 21. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, DICTATORSHIPS & DOUBLE STANDARDS (1982). 
 22. Id. 
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creasingly vocal nations of the third world and the post-colonial world as 
an expression of post-colonialism, not to the first or second worlds, save 
on occasions of high drama at the Security Council as a matter of great 
power politics, not human rights. 
However, transnational NGOs and new social movements were rising 
throughout the 1980s in the first and second worlds. They were rising in 
places ranging from the Western democratic networks supporting the 
Polish Solidarity movement and the Charter 77 advocates in Czechoslo-
vakia,23 to peace networks with aspirations to banish nuclear weapons 
from Western Europe in the Reagan years,24 to global human rights mon-
itoring, and the rise of global feminism and women’s rights advocacy, 
and the global environmental movement.25 These were movements pri-
marily within the industrialized world, within the first and second 
worlds, the world of industrialized democracies, and the world of social-
ist and communist states (at least those in the West, though certainly not 
China). The UN and global governance were not directly the focus of 
these efforts, because this would have constituted a massive diversion of 
resources at that point into organizations that carried no great weight 
with the Cold War still underway.26 There was also a growing, parallel 
network of developing world organizations that were focused on the 
United Nations as a source of influence and legitimacy, but they were to 
a large extent not visible to the organizations dealing with East-West is-
sues in the 1980s. The groundwork was yet being laid at the intellectual 
and ideological level for the entry of NGOs into a far more direct dialo-
                                                                                                                            
 23. Nick Young, NGOs and Civil Society in China, NICK YOUNG WRITES (Feb. 16, 
9:00 AM), http://www.nickyoungwrites.com/?q=civil_society. 
 24. Lawrence S. Wittner, Professor of History, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, Ad-
dress at NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace & Security (Nov. 18, 2004) (transcript 
available at http://disarm.igc.org (follow “events” hyperlink; then search “Wittner” and 
click follow “The Role of NGOs in Achieving Disarmament” hyperlink)). 
 25. The critical theory journal Telos, with its close attention to the intellectual and 
political currents of dissident movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, per-
haps best captured the theory and practice of these movements over the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. The intellectual evolution of these movements is found in English language 
sources in the Telos archives. See About TELOS, TELOS PRESS, 
http://www.telospress.com/ (follow “About TELOS” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 16, 
2011). 
 26. The general thrust of this observation is, I entirely grant, highly first world-
centric. There was a proliferation of more nonstate actors arising from the politics of, and 
ideological struggles of, the third world, but they were still not so very important in the 
Cold War and still not so very important to the UN, except to gradually effect a takeover 
of many of its—still not very important—institutions. For a strong exception to this point, 
see AKIRA IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 96–125 (2002). 
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gue with both state actors and international organizations such as the 
United Nations—primarily, but not exclusively, through the lever of in-
ternational human rights—about no less a question than who should have 
the legitimacy to run the world. 
II. RE-THINKING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
The opening provided by the end of the Cold War caused many people 
to believe that the world might enter a new period of global political 
coordination to match the economic globalization that was emerging dur-
ing the time. It was a period of heady liberal internationalism—the belief 
was popular that sovereign power politics could be overcome through a 
liberal version of international law, resulting in a benevolent and liberal 
global governance under a loose, but still federal, global law.27 Leading 
international law scholars offered pronouncements that the era of truly 
sovereign states was over, hope offered as description.28 
These hopes and dreams were fostered, somewhat perversely, by the 
remarkably united front offered by countries around the world, through 
the UN and the Security Council, to the invasion, occupation, and sack of 
Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. For once, it seemed, leading countries 
came together—including Russia and the United States—to take con-
certed military action against Iraq.29 Even if the United States overwhel-
mingly took the military lead, it was supported by a very broad coalition 
of states and the Security Council.30 President George H.W. Bush excited 
a great many globally when, in the wake of this action, he described a 
“new world order” that apparently seemed to foreshadow global gover-
nance through the UN and genuine collective security.31 
In retrospect, it is clear that different actors supported the collective 
military action against Iraq in Kuwait for very different reasons. Some 
did so because they were genuinely worried about Saddam’s naked use 
                                                                                                                            
 27. I borrow Francis Fukuyama’s useful definition. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 
7. 
 28. Perhaps most famously, Columbia Law School international law scholar, Louis 
Henkin, said, “Sovereignty . . . is not a necessary or appropriate external attribute for the 
abstraction called a state . . . . For legal purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the 
term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era.”  LOUIS HENKIN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9–10 (1995). 
 29. See Background Note: Kuwait, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm#history (last visited May 17, 2011). 
 30. Id. 
 31. President George H. W. Bush, Toward a New World Order, Address Before A 
Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 11, 1990)  (transcript available at 
http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr.htm); see also GEORGE BUSH & BRENT 
SCOWCROFT, A WORLD TRANSFORMED (1998). 
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of force to acquire an entire country as territory. Others joined because of 
Saddam’s genocidal (as Human Rights Watch concluded) human rights 
abuses within Iraq against the Kurds and others; their concern was fun-
damentally the internal political order under Saddam.32 Still other states, 
particularly Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia, looked at the 
conflict through the geopolitical aim of weakening Iraq. And still others 
supported the First Gulf War from the idealistic belief that this essential-
ly unprecedented military exercise in collective security would lead to 
long-term global governance through the United Nations. 
That was with respect to sovereign states and international organiza-
tions. Within a few years, however, those idealistic hopes for collective 
security were dashed—in large part by the outbreak of the Yugoslavia 
wars and, still later, the genocide in Rwanda. The international commu-
nity proved unable to respond to provide collective security; Europe 
proved unable to provide security even within Europe, and the Yugosla-
via wars came to a halt only when the United States, under the Clinton 
administration, decided finally that it had to intervene.33 In lieu of collec-
tive security as such, the UN Security Council implemented a series of 
war crimes tribunals that aimed to provide after-the-fact justice, first for 
Yugoslavia and later for Rwanda. These were widely celebrated as the 
beginnings of an international criminal justice system but, critics noted, 
their origins were as an alternative to actual intervention before or during 
the fact.34 At the same time, however, in the early 1990s, international 
                                                                                                                            
 32. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
THE KURDS (1993), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. My own 
contribution to this research, as a field researcher for Human Rights Watch in Iraq in 
1991, was published as HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN IN IRAQI 
KURDISTAN: THE DESTRUCTION OF KOREME (1992), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1992/12/01/anfal-campaign-iraqi-kurdistan. For the de-
finitive account of the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, see JOOST R. HILTERMANN, A 
POISONOUS AFFAIR: AMERICA, IRAQ, AND THE GASSING OF HALABJA (2007). My review 
can be found as Kenneth Anderson, America, Iraq, and Poison Gas, TIMES LITERARY 
SUPP., Jul. 9, 2008. 
 33. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier provide a superb account of the Clinton ad-
ministration’s foreign policy in all these matters. DEREK CHOLLET & JAMES GOLDGEIER, 
AMERICA BETWEEN THE WARS: 11/9 TO 9/11 (2008). 
 34. About the ICTY, U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); About ICTR, 
U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last vi-
sited Mar. 16, 2011); see also Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the 
Fall of Yugoslavia and the Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 33. VA. J. INT’L 
L. 385, 405 n.56 (1993). The suggestion that post hoc tribunals were being offered as an 
alternative to actual action was not a message anyone wanted to hear at that time, as I 
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NGOs became ever more active in these causes—human rights, interna-
tional tribunals, agitation for sovereign states to act in the former Yugos-
lavia, and many more. Their activities at the United Nations became 
more active as well. 
The cause that transformed the self-understanding of international 
NGOs during the 1990s was the international campaign to ban antiper-
sonnel landmines.35 By the late 1980s, humanitarian groups, particularly 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), had begun to 
raise awareness of the damage being caused by the heavy and increasing 
use of landmines in conflicts around the world. The issue appealed to a 
wide variety of international NGOs from a surprising range of perspec-
tives—human rights groups, environmentalists, humanitarian relief or-
ganizations, development NGOs, and more—and in the early 1990s, they 
came together to form a loose network, the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines.36 Taking advantage of the emerging technologies of the 
Internet—the cutting edge communications technologies of the day, 
email and listservs—they forged an international campaign for a treaty 
that would ban use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of landmines.37 
Initially rejected and, indeed, laughed off by leading states, the move-
ment succeeded in forcing powerful states, including the United States 
and others, to take account of the movement.38 The campaign eventually 
                                                                                                                            
discovered whenever I raised this among human rights groups, funding foundations, aca-
demics, or government officials. 
 35. I speak in this section from my personal experience as director of the Human 
Rights Watch Arms Division during the inception of the landmines ban campaign and the 
formation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 
 36. For one of the early manifestos of the movement, see THE ARMS PROJECT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES: A DEADLY 
LEGACY (1993). The book was an encyclopedic volume in the beginning days of the 
campaign. It laid out the basic propositions behind a ban treaty as well as the role of a 
wide range of international NGOs in pursuing it. 
 37. For a discussion in particular on the role of then-new Internet technologies in the 
globally networked world of international NGOs, see Charlotte Ku & John King Gamble, 
International Law-New Actors and New Technologies: Center Stage for NGOs?, 31 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 221 (2000). 
 38. The U.S. military’s approach to landmines and the campaign—sympathetic to the 
general humanitarian goal, but convinced both that new technologies would solve the 
problem and that, in any case, the situation of international border-guarding landmines 
were indispensable to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula—is discussed in 
Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United States Military Lawyer in Projecting a Vision 
of the Laws of War, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 445 (2003). 
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succeeded in enlisting Canada and several other important states and 
eventually produced the Ottawa Convention banning landmines.39 
The success of the NGO campaign against landmines did not go unno-
ticed by the United Nations, including the eventual Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan, and his senior advisors. They had been looking for political 
mechanisms to strengthen the UN as an instrument, not merely of the 
Member States of the UN or as a kind of negotiating table between sove-
reign states, but of independent global governance.40 Global governance 
that was to be conducted by the UN in its own name and as its own 
source of legitimacy and authority, beyond and indeed above that of in-
dividual nation-states, no matter how powerful. One question of deep and 
abiding importance, however, was the fact that the UN lacked legitimacy 
as a democratic actor.41 It had connections to Member States, but the UN 
itself lacked any direct connection, in the sense of democratic legitimacy, 
with the “peoples” of the world, as stated in the preamble of the Char-
                                                                                                                            
 39. For an account of the landmines campaign that argues both for the special role of 
NGOs, but also for the special role of Canada as facilitating the special role of NGOs, see 
WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES (Maxwell A. Came-
ron, Robert J. Lawson & Brian W. Tomlin eds., 1998). In particular, look to Michel Do-
lan & Chris Hunt, Negotiating in the Ottawa Process: The New Multilateralism, in WALK 
WITHOUT FEAR, id. at 392, 399, 408; Maxwell A. Cameron, Democratization of Foreign 
Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model, in WALK WITHOUT FEAR, id. at 424, 434, 440; 
Lloyd Axworthy, Towards a New Multilateralism, in WALK WITHOUT FEAR, id. at 448, 
456. 
 40. This was the view of what came eventually to be known by political scientist and 
senior UN advisor John Ruggie’s terminology: the “traditionalists” within the Secretariat 
who saw the legitimacy and authority of the UN as a function of the Member States, and 
the “modernizers” who saw the need to go beyond, or indeed around, the Member States 
and reach directly to legitimacy with global populations, including through and interme-
diated by, the international NGOs. This internal argument within the Secretariat is dis-
cussed in JAMES TRAUB, THE BEST INTENTIONS: KOFI ANNAN AND THE UN IN THE ERA OF 
AMERICAN WORLD POWER 383 (2006). 
 41. The notion of legitimacy used in this Essay is not intended to be a highly technic-
al one, as the subject is too complicated on its own. It is used here in the loosely Webe-
rian sense that “action, especially social action which involves a social relationship, may 
be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order.” 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 31 (Geunther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., 1978). I do not commit myself here to any deeply technical sense of the 
term, and broadly speaking this Essay subscribes to the generally understood idea of legi-
timacy as “widespread belief in a system of governing institutions . . . . Legitimacy de-
notes the positive valuation and acceptance enjoyed by a system of power and its bearers 
. . . .”  JOHN KEANE, PUBLIC LIFE AND LATE CAPITALISM: TOWARD A SOCIALIST THEORY 
OF DEMOCRACY 224 (1984). Specifically with regard to legitimacy and law in the con-
temporary United States, see the fine article by Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation 
in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379 (1983). 
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ter.42 The lack of a connection to people as such meant, by implication, 
that the legitimacy of the UN was merely through the Member States 
and, by further implication, that its legitimate activities and scope of au-
thority were merely what the Member States granted. The highest goal of 
global governance, as far as the senior leadership of the UN General Se-
cretariat was concerned, however, was to transcend the reliance for au-
thority and legitimacy upon the Member States, to govern, at least in 
some important matters, directly in the name of the UN and by appeal to 
the “peoples” of the world. 
And yet, there is no direct election to the UN; it is structured as an as-
sociation of Member States. It is not a global parliament that is elected 
by its people(s); it is a meeting ground of states. The ideological prob-
lem—the legitimacy problem—for the United Nations leadership, in pur-
suit of the authority of genuinely global governance, was to find a source 
of legitimacy that did not run through the Member States and yet did not 
require something that seemed—and seems—quite implausible if not 
fantastic: global parliamentary elections.43 The lesson of the NGO land-
mines campaign, to the UN leadership under Annan, was that interna-
tional NGOs, which could be perhaps plausibly understood as groups of 
global citizens, could be asserted as ‘representatives’ of the world’s 
peoples for purposes of providing the UN with a form of quasi-
democratic legitimacy, or at least a plausible connection to a global con-
stituency that did not run through the Member States.44 
                                                                                                                            
 42. Indeed, the very term “peoples” as used in the Charter preamble raises questions 
all its own, as distinguished from what might have been used instead. For example, “We 
the people of the world.” U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 43. There was indeed a movement, partly among academics and partly among activ-
ists, for a global parliament; proposals for its composition were sometimes modeled on 
the European parliament and sometimes expressed the view that its membership should 
consist of representatives of international NGOs. It was an idea that was given a veneer 
of public international respectability in the 1990s by appearing in a report of global “big 
names.” OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (1995). Most theorists, however, even those of impeccable liberal interna-
tionalist persuasion, found this a bridge too far. But this conceptual position had the salu-
tary quality of forcing liberal internationalists to articulate what they believed would be 
plausible for the legitimate governance in the way of representation and consent—
plausible both as a matter of being “doable” and as a matter of normatively satisfying the 
requirement of consent, if it was not to be democracy in the ordinary sense of the term. 
The global parliamentarians were refreshingly direct in their assertion that governance 
would not be legitimate if it was not democratic in the ordinary way—no obfuscation, no 
elision. 
 44. Annan’s rhetoric on this theme became more rhapsodic and ever more attuned to 
adulation of the international NGOs to a crescendo in 1999 to 2000. The Seattle riots and 
collapse of the trade talks in 1999 created what might best be described as great cognitive 
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For their part, the NGOs were happy to see themselves in this role. Be-
sides confirming their own auto-vision as the citizens of the world forc-
ing themselves into the closed negotiating sessions of states, being 
treated by the institutional UN as the legitimate representatives of the 
world’s peoples who, in turn, conferred legitimacy upon the UN and its 
claims to governance over the Member States, gave considerable status 
and power institutionally. International NGOs were no longer merely 
unofficial players standing outside the doors of power, outside the rooms 
in which states made their agreements—they had, in effect, the backing 
of the UN leadership at a minimum to seek a place at the negotiating 
tables themselves, armed with the claim that they had a special role as 
representatives of the world’s peoples.45 States overall were not pleased 
with this claim, but some—Canada, for example—tended to go along, 
particularly insofar as it might serve other state purposes, usually to di-
minish the power of the world’s remaining superpower, in the traditional 
geopolitical habit of middling states.46 And the precedent for NGOs join-
                                                                                                                            
dissonance for Annan in relation to the international NGOs and new transborder social 
movements, and 9/11, as the text discusses, was a game changer, as it were, in Annan’s 
attentions. 
 45. This is explicitly Maxwell A. Cameron’s argument in his essay, which appeared 
at the high water mark of theorizing of international NGOs as the interlocutors of states 
and international organizations in a new form of “democratized” global governance in 
1998. Cameron, Democratization, supra note 39, at 437, 444. 
 46. As Eric Posner notes in his book, the final results of the landmines movement 
might be as explainable by the traditional realist hypothesis that medium sized and mid-
dle power states, such as Canada, in effect supported and brought the Ottawa treaty about 
because, as with many other initiatives in international law, it supported their power posi-
tions by using rhetorical tools to bind the superpower. The NGOs were not irrelevant in 
this process, but it is mostly explainable by state-centric mechanisms, not some grand 
theory of international politics. ERIC POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 62–64 
(2009). 
  I do not share Posner’s skepticism, at least nowhere to that extent. My misgivings 
about NGOs, on the contrary, largely stem from the view that they are only too able to 
leverage their voices into debates above their level of legitimacy. I think that is true with 
respect to issues with which I disagree with the progressive NGO view and ones with 
which I agree, such as the landmines ban. On the factual question of the effectiveness of 
NGOs in doing something that governments would not otherwise have (eventually) done, 
my view, as an insider and academic of that process, is that the international campaign to 
ban landmines would not have achieved a widely accepted treaty—certainly not as quick-
ly—had the NGO movement not been so visible and so vocal, but also had the govern-
ment of Canada not decided to make it Canada’s foreign policy objective of the later 
1990s. I do not slight the NGO campaign in saying that Canada’s decision essentially to 
turn its entire worldwide diplomatic apparatus over to the NGO campaign gave access 
and lines of communication that otherwise would have made the campaign perhaps one 
of those unending but never quite “closing” campaigns. Canada’s actions, however, while 
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ing in treaty negotiations was already on the table after the landmines 
campaign—although, quite distinct from most other treaty negotiations, 
it was in the first place sponsored as much by the NGOs themselves. 
                                                                                                                            
compatible with its own vision of itself as the “moral” internationalist, are also compati-
ble with what, in those years, was widely seen as the interests of middling powers, to 
constrain the United States. 
  Moreover, the personal ambitions of Canada’s foreign minister in those years, 
Lloyd Axworthy, to win the Nobel Peace Prize, cannot be ruled out as a factor, and for 
that matter, ambitions among the NGOs and their leaders, as well. The ugly competitions 
among the various ‘virtuecrats’ for the Prize were, at least to me, astonishing—not least 
because they were conducted in the way that Angels of Mercy conduct their internecine 
competitions: the passive-aggression worthy of middle-school girls. The level of distrac-
tion they caused within the broader ban campaign was enough to persuade me that the 
merest hint of awarding some worthy cause the Prize suffices to derail that cause from its 
mission of goodness. As applied to Posner’s thesis, it bears noting that the NGOs are not 
the only “private” activities in such a campaign; personal ambitions, honor, glory, and a 
host of other factors are also at play. I doubt that Posner would deny that they have a 
place subsumed within larger state interests—but put that way, I think it underplays the 
sheer personal ambitions of Axworthy, Williams, and several others. Western realists 
persistently underestimate gloire as an individual motive—something Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, and Thucydides never did (and thanks to Philip Bobbitt for recalling this histori-
cal point to me). 
  In any case, we must be clear on what the campaign achieved and did not achieve: 
a ban treaty that has received adherence from a vast number of the world’s States, in 
some cases almost certainly insincerely, but with surprisingly plain rejection by precisely 
those States that must contemplate fighting a serious war in which losing is a serious 
possibility, which is to say, among others, the United States, India, Pakistan, China, Tai-
wan, and all the Middle East. Or countries with international borders, such as the Korean 
peninsula, in which unilateral removal of landmines could be as profoundly destabilizing 
as the introduction of nuclear weapons. Presumably the strategic calculus in favor of 
clarity lies in signaling to one’s likely enemies that all weapons, at least conventional 
ones, are on the table, and that breaking the status quo will be costly in materiel. 
  It does not detract from the achievement of the landmines ban treaty to note that it 
has received almost precisely the adherence that power theories would predict, but not 
more. In treaty matters, as the economists teach us, what matters is behavior on the mar-
gin. The fact that Germany adheres to the treaty does not really matter because, as Afg-
hanistan demonstrates, Germany does not intend ever to fight (although it does write 
quite outstanding laws of war manuals which receive remarkable numbers of citations for 
documents never really used in practice), while the fact that India does not adhere does 
matter, because one of these days, it might. Yet for all that, finally, the NGO movement 
was an indispensable catalyst on the front end, and scourge to see it through on the back 
end. See Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United States Military Lawyer in Projecting 
a Vision of the Laws of War, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 445, 452–53 (2003). 
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III. LEGITIMATION CRISIS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The institutional UN sought to elevate the UN’s own intellectual and 
ideological claims to governance by treating NGOs as the locus of the 
legitimacy of the world’s ‘peoples’. The NGOs, for their part, elevated 
their own intellectual and ideological self-conception by treating them-
selves (and inviting the UN and the rest of the world to treat them), not 
merely as international NGOs, but as something mysteriously called 
‘global civil society’. Why this special term and what was its special sig-
nificance? Why shift from calling international NGOs by a plain, prac-
tical, descriptive term—nongovernmental organizations—to calling them 
by a term far more laden with ideological significance in social and polit-
ical theory, the far more intellectually portentous, but also ideologically 
fraught—‘global civil society’?47 
The origins of the terminological shift lie in the effort by intellectuals 
and theorists of the landmines ban campaign to draw larger lessons—
with respect to both future NGO activity in very different fields as well 
as the very conception of globalization and global governance—from the 
leading role played by NGOs themselves. The increasingly fawning 
overtures made to the NGO community in this period by their counter-
part intellectuals and theorists within international organizations, the UN 
Secretariat and its so-called “modernizers”—those UN strategists who 
saw the transformation of the organization as dependent upon finding a 
source of legitimacy that would ‘go around’ the Member-States directly 
to global populations and constituencies—also played a role.48 This was 
also the period, after all, in which the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines and its coordinator, Jody Williams, won the 1997 Nobel 
Peace Prize over state officials, such as then-Canadian foreign minister 
Lloyd Axworthy, who had thrown all the weight of Canada’s worldwide 
                                                                                                                            
 47. Among the voluminous literature on “global civil society,” the source that stands 
out is the yearbook series, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius & 
Mary Kaldor, eds.). The series features empirical as well as conceptual articles on global 
civil society. 
 48. The whole proposition linking this newly described phenomenon of “global civil 
society” and the institutional UN was laid out in U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: 
Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Rep. of the Panel of Eminent 
Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, ¶¶ 68–72, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 
11, 2004). 
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diplomatic service behind the ban campaign and who might have thought 
that their efforts deserved equal recognition.49 
As a theoretical matter, however, NGOs, merely as such, are what they 
are—simply organizations consisting of interested individuals. Their mo-
tivations might be noble, altruistic, cosmopolitan, and so on, but they are, 
as a matter of political role, simply organizations that attempt to persuade 
international organizations, states, or others in authority, to act—
sometimes on the basis of NGO expertise and sometimes simply on the 
basis of their enthusiasm and ability to influence the national govern-
ments where they hold some level of political capital. Unsurprisingly, 
NGOs are most active in the world’s democratic states in which citizens’ 
groups can make themselves heard and their influence felt.50 
Expertise, even when genuine, and enthusiasm are not ordinarily con-
sidered sufficient to give one authority, however.51 The moral authority 
                                                                                                                            
 49. See Jody Williams, Nobel Laureate for Peace, Nobel Lecture at Nobel Peace Prize 
Ceremony (Dec. 10, 1997) (transcript available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/williams-lecture.html). 
 50. John Bolton provides a telling practical example of the way in which international 
NGOs operate in the quasi-alliance among international NGOs, sympathetic middling 
states, and UN bureaucrats in his description of the fights surrounding the UN’s attempts 
to create a small arms and light weapons control treaty—an effort that, in the hands of 
gun control NGOs, quickly morphed from a useful attempt to control the rampant spread 
of light weapons from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union across Africa into a cam-
paign to create an international treaty that would effectively seek an end run around 
handgun laws in individual states, and the United States in particular. JOHN BOLTON, 
SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION: DEFENDING AMERICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
ABROAD 87–92 (2007). That long term campaign, and counter-campaign, is ongoing, but 
Bolton, in his memoir of his time in the State Department and as U.S. ambassador to the 
UN, offers a revealing view of how NGOs pursued influence in the endless rounds of 
meetings—“wear the United States down until only its key issues are unresolved, declare 
it isolated, and then use the sleeplessness and frayed tempers of many late-night sessions 
to press us to ‘join consensus’ and avoid ‘isolation’.” Id. at 91. 
 51. Martin Shapiro astutely observes however, that the shift from government to go-
vernance marks a “significant erosion of the boundaries separating what lies inside a 
government and its administration and what lies outside them.” ANNE-MARIE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 9 (2004) (quoting Martin Shapiro, Administrative 
Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 369, 374 (2001)). One result is “to advantage ‘experts and enthusiasts,’ the two 
groups outside government that have the greatest incentive and desire to participate in 
governance processes; however ‘while the ticket to participation in governance is know-
ledge and/or passion, both knowledge and passion generate perspectives that are not 
those of the rest of us. Few of us would actually enjoy living in a Frank Lloyd Wright 
house.’” Id. at 9–10 (quoting Martin Shapiro). 
  Shapiro makes a crucial point. Indeed, my text above comes close to saying that 
expertise is enough, so long as “representativeness” by NGOs is not proclaimed. But that 
is actually too much of a concession on my part, in consideration of Shapiro’s observa-
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of NGOs in the international arena had traditionally rested upon recog-
nized expertise and effectiveness in their particular missions—the relief 
group, for example, whose acknowledged record in wartime humanita-
rian aid gave a certain practical as well moral authority to its views be-
fore international bodies in areas of its subject matter. The ICRC was 
always the model—careful, precise, never flamboyant, typically self-
effacing, and above all competent in its areas of expertise. But the ICRC, 
and international NGOs seeking to model their efforts at global public 
policy on its example, never sought to claim a role in governance as 
such.52 
Indeed, the contrast between the ICRC and everyone else is instructive. 
The nature of the ICRC’s mission is far more automatically self-limiting 
than that of the human rights and other “values” based international 
NGOs. The ICRC’s ostensible mission is the narrow conditions of hu-
manitarian relief in the most dire conditions in which the baseline moral 
theory is that no one—no side—can rationally, let alone morally, object 
to the provision of humanitarian relief to the suffering noncombatants.53 
                                                                                                                            
tion about experts and enthusiasts under regimes of “governance” rather than “govern-
ment.” Were I giving a full statement of my view, it would be far closer to Shapiro’s on 
this essential matter. For that matter, we ought not to leave this without noting how much 
the debate owes to two scholarly works: MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1965); ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, LOYALTY, AND VOICE (1970). Experts and 
enthusiasts are able to gain their special traction through Olson’s collective action prob-
lem. OLSON, supra note 51. And the problem of the “governed” in this case is that there is 
no obvious mechanism, faced with the passions of experts and enthusiasts (and those for 
whom they are the same thing), for the governed to make an “exit” from their regimes of 
governance. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 51, at 60–61. 
 52. The ICRC stands, however, in a position slightly different from that of any other 
international NGO. Indeed, in an important sense, the ICRC does have a limited, recog-
nized, treaty-based role in governance in the laws of war. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
give juridical recognition to the unique role of the ICRC in conveying neutral humanita-
rian aid and relief; in convening conferences and treaty negotiations in international hu-
manitarian law; and in acting as the repository of sovereign accessions to the Geneva 
Conventions. In other words, when it comes to drafting international humanitarian law 
treaties, the ICRC does have a juridical seat at the table, and might well chair it. This 
privilege has been far from irrelevant to the ICRC; unsurprisingly, it has been not entirely 
enthused about the barbarians at the gates, as it were, the hoi polloi of the NGO move-
ment seeking to join negotiations on roughly the same terms. But the ICRC claims to a 
role in the “governance” of international humanitarian law have always been based on the 
assertion of its unique neutrality, not, as the text elaborates with respect to the general 
international NGO movement, representativeness and intermediation. 
 53. The ICRC’s stated mission is as follows: “The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusive-
ly humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict 
and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.” The ICRC’s Mis-
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The rationale of what one’s mission, legitimacy, reach can be when con-
strained by the notion of “bare rationality” to which no one could object 
can, and has been, stretched in practice. It has been most stretched in 
practice at the ICRC in its efforts to shepherd along the trends of interna-
tional humanitarian law—the temptation to extend is harder to resist than 
it is when confined by bare humanitarian necessity as a justification. 
Nevertheless, despite some temptation to inflate a bubble of idealism, 
the nature of the ICRC’s work contains a large amount of automatic def-
lators. That is not so with the rest of the human rights NGOs, for whom 
the tendencies point overwhelmingly to inflate one’s sense of self-
importance, reach of mission, and definition of that upon which one 
should both opine and be heard. The tendency starts from the fundamen-
tal problem that anything can, if one likes, be formulated as a human 
right; the rhetoric starts from an inflated bubble and carries on from 
there. But these tendencies to inflate are independent of the claims of 
expertise and competence; they raise their own problems, quite separate-
ly, that we all understand that the line between “neutral” expertise and 
expertise that somehow magically drives without fail to a given policy 
end, interested and disinterested technocracy, is far more of an artifact 
than reality, at least in these inevitably values-driven matters of human 
rights. When one’s expertise lies in “human rights”—even when it is the 
“law” of human rights—to take the simplest example, expertise is itself a 
set of ideological commitments, good or bad. In Martin Shapiro’s terms, 
in these matters, at least, the “experts” are inevitably also “enthusiasts.”54 
The success of the landmines ban campaign, however, including the 
resulting attention from senior leadership of international organizations, 
convinced theorists of the international NGO movement that it was 
something more than merely a collection of organizations speaking for 
themselves.55 The intellectuals and theorists of the international NGO 
movement developed an ambitious political and social theory that re-
conceptualized international NGOs into something politically and ideo-
logically suitable to serve as a partner to public international organiza-
tions—the UN—in the service of global governance. This re-
conceptualization drew upon an old political and social theory in West-
ern intellectual tradition, the theory of civil society, and asserted it as a 
                                                                                                                            
sion Statement, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-mission-190608.htm. 
 54. Shapiro, supra note 51. 
 55. See Kenneth Anderson & Monica Schurtman, The United Nations Response to the 
Crisis of Landmines in the Developing World, 36 HARV. INT’L L. J. 359, 359 (1995). 
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paradigm at the global level, as ‘global civil society’.56 The conventional 
account of global civil society—but also its unconventional, skeptical 
critique—runs approximately as follows; it begins again where this Es-
say began.57 
Economic globalization has taken place through innovations that have 
brought down the cost of transportation and, even more dramatically, 
communications across borders and over long distances.58 That implies, 
in the view of many, a corresponding need for political globalization to 
address the many issues of coordination that arise when economic activi-
ties (in the broadest sense of movement of goods, services, capital, and 
labor) can shift increasingly freely around the world.59 Political globali-
zation can take either of two main forms, however, a minimalist form or 
a maximalist form. The minimalist form says that globalization can be 
given such regulation as it requires by coordination of sovereign jurisdic-
tions without, however, giving up the essential attribute of sovereign-
ty60—a political community, without a political superior.61 Cooperation 
                                                                                                                            
 56. The leading statement was given by the left wing British political theorist John 
Keane, in his influential and impressive book published in 2003 which drew upon his 
theoretical work over the previous decade. JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2003). 
 57. This is a version of the critical argument offered in Kenneth Anderson & David 
Rieff, Global Civil Society: A Sceptical View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5, at 26 
(Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius & Mary Kaldor eds., 2005). 
 58. Although the specific facts are now out of date, the argument is as relevant as 
ever. See ALAN RUGMAN, THE END OF GLOBALIZATION (2000) (arguing that much of what 
is understood as globalization is really the lowering of communications costs and any-
thing digitized that can be transmitted relying upon such technologies. Things that weigh, 
and hence have transportation costs associated with them, still have transaction costs of 
movement, and hence there is a noticeable tendency to regionalization of such goods). 
 59. For an excellent introduction to the social theory of globalization, see MALCOLM 
WATERS, GLOBALIZATION (2d ed. 2001). Waters sets out the sociology relevant to the 
argument that economic globalization implies some form of political globalization. 
 60. The argument for coordination among sovereigns as the proper form of political 
globalization is laid out in Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sove-
reignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1255, 1259–66 (2005) [hereinafter Anderson, Squaring the Circle]. It is also what 
Francis Fukuyama calls for as the position of the United States after neoconservatism, in 
FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 155–80; likewise, JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY: WHY THE WORLD SHOULD WELCOME AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004). 
Yet this position is not that far, in principle, from the global government networks ap-
proach offered by SLAUGHTER, supra note 51. Much of the difference has to do with 
where you think the process should, over the long run, wind up—as permanent multilate-
ralism among sovereigns or some sort of gradually emerging, genuinely global gover-
nance. 
 61. Borrowing Lincoln’s classic formulation. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress 
in Special Session (Jul. 4, 1861). 
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and coordination among sovereigns, even entering various political ar-
rangements that would provide for arbitration and rule-making in matters 
as diverse as the environment or public health, can be robust, yet without 
ever conceding the fundamental attributes of sovereignty: call this ‘ro-
bust multilaterism.’ 
The maximalist form says, on the contrary, that globalization requires 
an ultimately federal system in which sovereignty of individual nation-
states is given up in favor of a central locus of governance that can en-
force behavior in the collective interest, rather than a situation of indi-
vidual countries forever breaking the rules in their immediate self-
interest, whether the matter at issue is economic, security, or something 
else.62 Maximalists ordinarily point to the UN as the forum that should 
gradually evolve from a forum for multilateral discussion and, some-
times, cooperation and coordination, into a true global government. The 
term ‘global governance’ is currently favored over the more plain ‘global 
government’ because, as it became clear in the course of the 1990s that 
nation-states were not interested in giving up their sovereignty as such to 
a global government, theorists of political globalization invented a new 
theory by which the UN would exercise “governance” without (some-
how) actually being the “government.”63 
What speaks in favor of the maximalist model? The practical argument 
is that no effective global coordination or cooperation will last over the 
long term except by a single global governor, able to enforce law and 
regulation in the classic definition of law as command backed by the ef-
fective threat of coercion. That argument appeals to realists, for whom 
the test of law really is a command backed by an effective threat.64 
Equally important, however, is the idealistic argument—indeed, this is 
the one that has always appealed to the global bourgeoisie, the emerging 
middle classes from the dawn of the modern era onwards—that the world 
and history are gradually progressing toward a unified world, in which 
individually sovereign states must gradually give way to a global gov-
ernment for the cooperative good of all. Particularly given that nation-
                                                                                                                            
 62. The literature on this proposition is nearly endless. See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, 
Who Killed Sovereignty: Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty in International 
Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L. J. 463 (1996). Perez, like many (including me) who started out 
enthusiastic about global governance and the supposed erosion of sovereignty, over the 
years has become much, much more cautious. 
 63. The conceptual machinery behind the terminological shift was given by 
WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? 
(1998). 
 64. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
2054, 2090–94 (1995). 
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states are established precisely on the principle of the ability to exercise 
ultimate control over activities within their territory—why should a 
global political system not require precisely such reach? It is an argu-
ment from idealism that takes the successful nation-state as the model for 
what a global order ought to look like, even though that means supplant-
ing the nation-state itself. Indeed, it is a form of constitutionalism—
global constitutionalism—and is often represented as such.65 
The minimalist position—the defender of national sovereignty, even if 
committed to robust multilateralism—usually comes off in this compari-
son as the retrograde stance: defender of crude sovereignty and the privi-
leges, justified or not, of states simply because they are states. But there 
is both a realist and idealist argument to be made for the ‘sovereigntist’ 
position. First, the necessary regulation of the global economy can take 
place among sovereigns; the range of things that can be undertaken will 
almost certainly be shorter and narrower and regulation less satisfyingly 
global than it would be under a genuinely federal constitutional system 
for the planet as a whole. Regulation of trade, in which the benefits of 
adhering to a common system even when one loses sometimes in rulings 
and arbitration vastly outweigh the costs of staying out, is likely to gain 
in solidity over time.66 
Security, on the other hand, is likely to remain fragmented; the costs of 
adhering to a system that might pose to important players, if not existen-
tial threats, then very serious ones, makes it a matter of adherence that is 
discontinuous with an activity such as trade. But the idealist argument 
explains why, in any case, this should be: the idealist argument for sove-
reignty, for robust multilateralism without giving up sovereignty, asserts 
the intrinsic value of a self-governing political community, a democratic 
political community, one that obtains its legitimacy from the consent of 
its members.67 
If that ideal argument has merit, then a certain amount of departure 
from maximalist efficiency in running the world is merited in the inter-
ests of self-government. It will be observed, however, that this idealist 
argument in favor of sovereignty is most particularly an argument in fa-
                                                                                                                            
 65. See, e.g., Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 51 (2006) (de Wet’s footnotes are especially helpful in tracing through the 
full impact of this thought in contemporary European public international law). 
 66. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the most successful of the international governance 
organizations has been the World Trade Organization; the least successful have been 
those related to collective security. 
 67. This is not always a “conservative” position. In particular, see, Jed Rubenfeld, 
The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Fall 2003. Rubenfeld, a leading constitutional law 
scholar at Yale Law School, is very, very far from being a conservative. 
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vor of democratic sovereignty, in which sovereignty is genuinely an ex-
pression of the consent of the governed.68 Not all the idealistic arguments 
are on the side of global governance, with merely a crabbed realism 
counseling against—although one would scarcely know it, to survey the 
literature, which frankly soars into a limitless Platonism over the future 
possibilities of a unified, globally governed world.69 
IV. THE INVENTION OF ‘GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY’ 
If, however, one is persuaded by the global governance position, 
whether on realist or idealist grounds, or both, then one must confront the 
question of legitimacy that the UN’s own theorists of global governance 
confronted. For them, the international NGO movement could provide 
that legitimacy, the will of the peoples of the world, that otherwise 
seemed lacking. But this role also corresponded nicely, in the view of 
other theorists of international NGOs and global social movements, with 
the concept of civil society in a domestic society.70 By the 1980s, ‘civil 
society’ (which has a very long and, importantly, shifting lineage in 
Western political and social theory71) had come to mean the “indepen-
dent sector,”72 as theorized especially by intellectuals of the new social 
movements and dissident writers in such movements as Poland’s Solidar-
ity. That is to say, social institutions that were neither the market nor the 
state, the NGOs, the social movements, citizens groups, religious organi-
zations, some political but many not, which gave meaning and social tex-
ture to individuals’ lives.73 
                                                                                                                            
 68. I make this argument at greater length in Anderson, Squaring the Circle, supra 
note 60, at 1266. As expressed in that article, “we are all idealists now.” Id. 
 69. Platonism about global governance and the United Nations reaches its fullest 
flower in PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS (2006). “UN Platonism” is a term that I have borrowed from Mi-
chael Glennon. See Michael J. Glennon, Platonism, Adaptivism and Illusion in UN 
Reform, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 613 (2006). 
 70. A useful introduction to the historical and contemporary uses of the term is found 
in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON (John A. Hall ed., 1995). 
 71. See MARVIN B. BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY: A PRIVILEGED MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND FRANCE 
(1994) (an outstanding study of the role of civil society in a certain place and time in 
history). 
 72. The archives of the critical theory journal, Telos, with its emphasis on critical 
European thought and social theory, especially from Eastern Europe, are vital sources in 
understanding the evolution of thinking around the concept of civil society as it emerged 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 73. See, e.g, JEAN L. COHEN AND ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL 
THEORY (1992). 
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In democratic societies, the civil society organizations were a mechan-
ism by which citizens could organize to express and press and advocate 
for their views. In undemocratic authoritarian and totalitarian societies, 
civil society organizations were sometimes swept up by or co-opted by 
the state—the union of the Church and fascist political authority by 
Franco’s Spain,74 for example. In the 1970s and 1980s, as civil society 
organizations began to thrive as the forbidden, and later half-forbidden—
forbidden but tolerated within certain bounds—in the Soviet empire, they 
served as a means of pressing authorities with an implicit claim to 
represent the ‘true’ interests and desires of the people. The difference in 
the role of civil society organizations in the two types of society is cru-
cial.75 
                                                                                                                            
 74. See, e.g., VÍCTOR PÉREZ DÍAZ, THE RETURN OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE EMERGENCY 
OF DEMOCRATIC SPAIN (1993). 
 75. In identifying the contrasting roles of civil society in settled domestic democratic 
societies bearing democratic legitimacy with undemocratic societies lacking fundamental 
legitimacy domestically, I am leaving aside two otherwise crucial points about legitima-
cy. 
  First, legitimacy is not an on-off switch; a society or a regime of governance ei-
ther has it or it does not. It is not that simple. Indeed, it is so far from being that simple 
that legitimacy is not well explained as a matter of “degree” along a sliding continuum, 
either. The legitimacy of a governing regime, for example, is not confined to having 
“more” or “less” legitimacy. Rather, the crucial question with regards to legitimacy is 
instead, “Legitimacy for what?” Maintaining basic law and order on the streets, or essen-
tial public services, even in a repressive, undemocratic regime? Collecting taxes? Under-
taking war? 
  Regimes of governance can and often do have “general” legitimacy, a legitimacy 
of general “status,” because the fullest form of legitimacy is a sort of latency, a residual 
propensity to adhere among the governed. That is what we ordinarily associate, in We-
ber’s terms, with the general status-legitimacy of settled domestic societies and their 
governance. See Weber, supra note 41. 
  But on the margins, the question is not status-legitimacy, nor is it possessing 
“more” legitimacy or “less,” but instead legitimacy to what particular ends. In Fujimori’s 
Peru, the regime’s ordinary police officers had the legitimacy to stop speeders in cars on 
the highway; its investigators had the legitimacy to pursue Sendero’s leader, Abimael 
Guzman; and to be clear, this otherwise most illegitimate of regimes nonetheless had the 
legitimacy to fight Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru urban guerrillas. See Peter 
Chalk, The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy, 44 AUSTL. J. POL. 
& HIST. 373, 382–84 (1998). The law of occupation offers another example of this sense 
of “legitimate” order amidst what might well be regarded by many people internally as 
the essential “illegitimacy” of the occupier. (I am grateful to conversations with Stephen 
D. Krasner on exactly this matter of particularized points of legitimacy even amidst a 
broader regime of illegitimacy, and its flip-side, particularized points of illegitimacy 
amidst a broader regime of legitimacy. Interview with Stephen D. Krasner, Professor, 
Stanford Univ. (Jan. 13, 2011)). 
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In a genuinely democratic society, civil society organizations are free 
to advocate, organize, argue, debate, and cajole. Ultimately, however, 
political authorities are accountable not to civil society organizations, but 
instead to citizens who vote in the privacy of the voting booth. The legi-
timacy of the democratic system depends, ultimately, upon the free and 
                                                                                                                            
  The second is that the world is filled with many states that are both non-
democratic and legitimate. Not necessarily good—but still broadly legitimate. Some of 
them correspond to what Weber described as “traditional” bases of legitimacy in genuine-
ly traditional societies—although those bases, as well as those regimes, come under in-
creasing pressure in the modern world. Bases of social legitimacy abound even in the 
modern world, ranging from (still) the divine right of kings to “he who prevents the tribes 
from slaughtering each other” and many bizarre and frankly bad rationales of legitimacy. 
Moreover, legitimacy in the modern world as Weber himself conceived it was not about 
democracy or consent, but rather was about the rise of the bureaucratic and administrative 
state, replacing traditional and charismatic sources of legitimacy with those of adminis-
trative efficiency, the “rational-legal” authority of the state—not consent of the governed 
as such, for Weber, after all, was a product not of America but Germany. See Weber, 
supra note 41. 
  At this moment, the rising notion of legitimacy in the world is not democracy and 
consent, but the legitimacy of an authoritarian government that leverages the “coherence” 
given by its authoritarianism, command-and-control, to create rapid economic growth: 
China and its would-be imitators. In that sense, legitimacy is, as Weber suggests, simply 
a matter of fact about what a people and a society will accept as “legitimate.” See Weber, 
supra note 41. (For purposes of this Essay, I leave aside saying more either about ge-
nuinely “traditional” societies, or conceptual views of legitimacy that introduce genuine 
normativity, beyond simply the fact of what populations accept.) 
  In societies whose governance is undemocratic and yet broadly legitimate, how-
ever, the notion of civil society is quite different—or quite possibly, largely nonexistent. 
It is a profound mistake to assume that all associations of private life should be construed 
as “their” form of civil society—civil society is a commitment that arises in a specific 
social and political history and is not in that sense ‘universal private life.’ Far from it. 
Even if it arises prior to the rise of genuine universal democracy—late-arriving, after 
all—it is deeply associated with private association in public life. It is in this meaning 
contrasted with the withdrawal into private life—the consolations of private life and 
family away from the public square. They have different social functions and correspond 
to different human values. 
  Civil society, even if it historically antedates universal democratic states, is utter-
ly historically intertwined with notions of governance by some form of public consent. 
That is not the case with many forms of legitimate, but not democratic, society, and with 
the notion of private life as such, which may or may not be civil society. The discussion 
above does not address these kinds of societies. One might say, speaking normatively, 
that they ought to develop both mechanisms of genuine public consent at the level of the 
state, and concomitantly civil society as well. That they are broadly legitimate is not at 
issue—although recent events in the Arab world serve to point out that “legitimacy” can 
be real, and yet vanish quickly—but what they can teach us about civil society, including 
global civil society, is really very little, because, structurally speaking, they don’t possess 
it. 
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unconstrained vote of the citizens. Civil society organizations are impor-
tant to the free flow of information and debate and policy in society—but 
they are not the guarantor of its legitimacy. In particular, in a domestic, 
democratic society, civil society is immensely important to the robust 
and intelligent functioning of democracy, especially representative de-
mocracy, but civil society is conceived as neither ‘representative’ nor as 
a necessary political ‘intermediary’ between government and the go-
verned. The ballot box plays that role instead.76 Legitimacy in a democ-
racy is given by people raising their hands and voting—not by the pres-
ence of citizens or activist groups as civil society, however important 
they may be to articulating versions of a society’s politics. 
In an undemocratic society that nonetheless tolerates some level of civ-
il society organizations, however, matters are quite different. There is no 
ballot box to convey legitimacy and, if democracy in fact matters, then in 
an important sense the society’s governance is not (fully) legitimate. Le-
gitimacy is not always conveyed by democracy, to be sure; historically, 
democracy is a rather special idea, in a historical world in which legiti-
macy was conveyed by kingship, by blood, by kinship, by religious sanc-
tion—by mechanisms in which the consent of the governed was scarcely 
at issue and certainly not by specifically democratic mechanisms and 
voting.77 In the world that has emerged since 1945, however, the secular 
trend has been toward a world in which democratic consent in some fa-
shion, and most usually by the ballot box, has been understood as a sine 
qua non of legitimate government.78 But what happens to civil society, 
what is its role in an otherwise modern society that lacks democracy or 
                                                                                                                            
 76. For a fascinating account of the rise of the ballot box and the secret ballot, see Jill 
Lepore, Rock, Scissors, Paper: How We Used to Vote, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 2008, 
at 90. 
 77. The notes have earlier stipulated that this discussion utilizes only a crude, non-
technical, broadly Weberian notion of legitimacy. However, the legitimacy for the pur-
poses sought in genuinely federal global governance requires more than a politics—it 
requires a society, in Weber’s sense and for Weberian reasons. The kind of legitimacy 
that now exists in the UN is essentially political in nature and derivation, because there is 
no international society in the sense of actual people. The international society of states 
offers an analogue, a homologue, of legitimacy within domestic social orders, but that is 
a political construct taken by analogy to the social legitimacy found within actual socie-
ties. The political legitimacy of the international order is limited and analogical, as Tho-
mas Franck acknowledged in his influential book, THOMAS FRANK, THE POWER OF 
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 49 (1990). 
 78. A point argued by some even as a matter of international law. See, e.g., Thomas 
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992) 
(international legal scholar Thomas Franck, writing in 1992, that democracy “is on the 
way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and pro-
tected by collective international processes”). 
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democratic legitimacy? Either civil society is repressed, often brutally, as 
in a truly totalitarian society. Or else tolerated—precisely because it 
serves as a political safety valve for the broader democratic aspirations of 
the population. Either way, however, what it cannot do is actually offer 
democratic legitimacy, because it is not the ballot or the ballot box. 
Indeed, in fascist regimes, such as Mussolini or Franco’s, the “official-
ly” accepted organizations of what we might call ‘faux civil society’ 
were explicitly treated as representative, intermediary organizations be-
tween the people and the state, in a corporatist sense.79 The Communist 
dictatorships did something similar.80 The ruling elites of these undemo-
cratic societies knew perfectly well that they lacked ballot box legitima-
cy—or at least were unwilling to test it, over and over again, in the way 
of a long term, stable democracy—and so substituted organizations of 
‘faux civil society’ as the supposed legitimating intermediaries between 
state and people. This is political “corporatism,” not democracy or repub-
licanism.81 Organizations of genuine civil society, such as Solidarity in 
Poland, constantly wrestled with what its role should be in an undemo-
cratic society.82 
In the conventional account, global civil society is offered as the global 
homologue of civil society in a settled domestic society. For several 
years, this analogy seemed unimpeachable; global civil society would act 
as civil society does in an ordinary domestic society. It would agitate, 
advocate, cajole, demand, organize, lobby, and do all the functions of 
organizations and social movements in a settled domestic society. But 
gradually, the question arose as to what kind of domestic society and 
what kind of civil society. The civil society of a domestic democratic 
                                                                                                                            
 79. See, e.g., DÍAZ, supra note 74. 
 80. See, e.g., C.J. Albertie, Survey and Critique of Russian Law and Its Effect on 
NGOs, 2 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y L. 12 (2004); Marcia A. Weigle, On the Road to the Civil 
Forum: State and Civil Society from Yeltsin to Putin, 10 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 117 (2002); 
ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, & LEGITIMACY (2000). 
 81. I am here adapting an argument against global civil society as bearer of democrat-
ic legitimacy offered by John Bolton who was, so far as I know, the first person to articu-
late it in the current debate. “It is,” Bolton writes, “precisely the detachment from gov-
ernments that makes international civil society so troubling, at least for democracies . . . . 
the civil society idea actually suggests a ‘corporativist’ approach to international deci-
sion-making that is dramatically troubling for democratic theory because it posits ‘inter-
ests’ (whether NGOs or businesses) as legitimate actors along with popularly elected 
governments . . . . Mussolini would smile on the Forum of Civil Society.” John Bolton, 
Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 217–18 (2000). 
But it is noteworthy that a serious, reflective, liberal internationalist such as Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has taken the essence of the criticism on-board in her own call for governance 
via global government networks, not NGO networks. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 51. 
 82. See, e.g., POLAND: A COUNTRY STUDY (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1992) 
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society, in which legitimacy ultimately flowed from votes of citizens, 
and in which the function of political civil society was to organize and 
channel—but not pretending to stand, because of the independent exis-
tence of the ballot box, as corporatist intermediaries or representatives 
between the people and their government? Or the civil society of an un-
democratic society, in which, precisely because of the state’s undemo-
cratic character, civil society was—by necessity, by opposition, by coop-
tion, by whatever mechanism—treated as a representative and interme-
diary? 
Given that the international system—the UN system—the system of 
global governance, to the extent it existed or could be, among interna-
tional idealists, imagined into being, was palpably not democratic, then 
these international NGOs, recast as a matter of ideology as ‘global civil 
society,’ were likewise palpably not the organizations of civil society of 
a democratic society. This did not matter much, so long as the aspirations 
of the players in the system—the governance ideologists of the UN sys-
tem and their confreres among the international NGOs—did not extend 
to matters of global importance. The fact that the international system 
lacked specifically democratic legitimacy did not so much matter when 
the issues presented to the system were either narrowly technocratic or 
else matters of mere multilateral negotiation among states, not claims for 
the UN to govern in its own name.83 
But by the mid-1990s, the aspirations of this global system were reach-
ing beyond the legitimacy that could be said to attach to the earlier sys-
tem. The UN was seeking to take on governance tasks that quite appar-
ently required much greater legitimacy than the existing system had or 
could claim to possess, given the available sources of legitimacy—
effectively delegation from the member-states.84 It was doing so as a 
strategy of a virtuous circle—leveraging up its legitimacy by leveraging 
                                                                                                                            
 83. There is, of course, another possibility altogether, the customary radical move—
that democratic legitimacy is a red herring that does not matter. On the contrary, it is 
merely a front argument from reactionary defenders of sovereignty. Legitimacy does not 
require democratic participation as such. This is approximately the radical left view of-
fered by global civil society activist and scholar Alison Van Roy in ALISON VAN ROOY, 
THE GLOBAL LEGITIMACY GAME: CIVIL SOCIETY, GLOBALIZATION, AND PROTEST (2004). It 
is a form of radical argument distinct from the “redefinition” of participation, representa-
tion, and democracy response, however, found in David Held and others, and critiqued 
separately below. See infra note 90; DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 
(1995). 
 84. See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2008). For a representative list of the tasks the UN undertook, see 
Honouring 60 Years of United Nations Peace Keeping, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/events/peacekeeping60/1990s.shtml (last visited May 16, 2011). 
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up its governance activities, so to acquire more legitimacy, and so on 
round and round. Moreover, it was also being assigned such tasks by 
powerful nation-states (not infrequently including the United States) 
seeking to offload global obligations from their own shoulders.85 
Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, weapons of mass destruction anti-
proliferation, human rights in an ever expanding array with reach into 
individual sovereign states, the security problems of failed and failing 
states—these issues, especially as they reached inside states, were un-
derstood to require greater legitimacy than offered by the multilateral 
system of Member States of the UN. That legitimacy, in order to legiti-
mate such governance, required overcoming the so-called “democratic 
deficit”—a deficit also identified and much debated in the context of the 
European Union. Indeed, for numbers of global constitutionalists—
global federalists of global governance located in European academic 
and policy centers—the European Union offered the way forward for the 
world. It had achieved, in the minds of its architects and civil servants, at 
any rate, democratic legitimacy without all the ordinary trappings of na-
tion-state democracy—and the same model could, with sufficient atten-
tion, be ramped up to the world as a whole.86 
In that case, however, legitimacy that was close to democratic legiti-
macy—ballot box legitimacy—was required and, yet, at the planetary 
level, not really imaginable. Some dreamers dreamed—and still do—of a 
planetary parliament directly elected by populations around the world.87 
Most others—even many who are otherwise deeply committed to the 
political ideals of global governance in a globally federal system—accept 
that planetary democracy in that sense is meaningless and unachieva-
ble.88 Among its many difficulties, it confuses the limits in space and 
                                                                                                                            
 85. For example, see CHOLLET & GOLDGEIER, supra note 33, at 272–75, on the U.S. 
seeking to find ways to utilize the UN against terrorism and other issues in the Clinton 
years. 
 86. See, e.g., de Wet, supra note 62 (describing an international system, and anno-
tated with compelling footnotes). Much of this is challenged, with an equally engrossing 
set of footnotes, in Ernest A. Young, The Trouble With Global Constitutionalism, 38 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 532–38 (2003). 
 87. See, e.g., Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, 80 
FOREIGN AFF. 212, 216–20 (2001). 
 88. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example: 
Yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of 
such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual 
liberty. Further, the diversity of the peoples to be governed makes it almost im-
possible to conceive of a global demos. No form of democracy within the cur-
rent global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles. 
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population upon what can be genuinely called a ‘democracy’ with the 
unlimited, potentially infinitely upwardly scalable, networks of a com-
mon market.89 The latter becomes more efficient the larger it becomes; 
the former breaks down. The world’s great democratic societies are tra-
deoffs, sometimes uneasy ones, between the political requirements of 
democracy, which counsels limits on size, and the economic blessings of 
an ever larger common market. But, in the search for legitimacy in a sys-
tem that, imagined for the planet as a whole, is too large for ballot box 
legitimacy, but which proposes tasks for which the legitimacy is greater 
than that which can be conveyed ‘upwards’ by Member States to the UN 
as a multilateral exercise—what is available? 
The NGOs, of course, are available. But in that case, the form of anal-
ogy with domestic civil society is not that of a democratic society, but 
instead one in which necessarily the NGOs act in the absence of the bal-
lot box. They are therefore treated as a kind of ideological stand in for 
democratic institutions and in that sense resemble civil society in an un-
democratic state. Why does it matter? It matters because under these 
conditions, this global civil society is treated by the international system, 
by the UN and its administrators and governors and ideologists, as repre-
sentative and intermediaries of the ‘peoples of the world’ who do not 
otherwise have a direct vehicle for their expression.90 The conventional 
                                                                                                                            
SLAUGHTER, supra note 51, at 8. 
 89. Researchers who study global democracy have noted the size and population 
constraints—smaller along both dimensions makes democracy easier and more likely. 
See Larry Diamond & Svetlana Tsalik, Size and Democracy: The Case for Decentraliza-
tion, in LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 117–60 
(1999). 
 90. For many, to be sure, and the NGOs not least among them, this is a feature, not a 
bug. It is the argument laid out by, for example, David Held and his co-authors in many 
books and articles—that legitimacy does not require democracy in the ballot box sense, 
and that legitimacy in the sense of consent can be got by many different mechanisms, 
including through intermediaries such as global civil society. (Held’s is a very peculiar 
body of work—by turns technocratic, predictive, rhapsodic, hortatory, and, well, schem-
ing, but always toward the proper ends of history, or something very like that.) See, e.g., 
HELD, supra note 83; see also Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the Unit-
ed Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 
107, 127–29 (1996). One would caution those seeking to make this move because they 
(a) want to declare global civil society as “representative” and (b) recognize that democ-
racy won’t be possible, make it rather easy on themselves; this practically defines ad hoc, 
not to say self-serving, political theory. But it is a move urged not merely by those advo-
cating for civil society organizations over the ballot box; it is a move quite consistent 
with a certain form of law-and-economics reductivism—the reductivism of dismissing 
the ballot box not as the means to “consent” in the deep sense of civic republicanism, but 
merely as one means among many by which to find “revealed preferences.” This bland 
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account of global civil society, as the wholesome homologue of civil so-
ciety in a settled domestic society—particularly in an era in which civil 
society and its virtues had been extensively theorized, discussed, and 
praised as a necessary pillar of liberal democratic society—attained tre-
mendous influence. It figured in many speeches at the UN, by UN senior 
leaders such as Kofi Annan and his chief aides. Kofi Annan, after all, 
could not have been more explicit when in 1999 he said that if the “glob-
al agenda is to be properly addressed, a partnership with civil society is 
not an option; it is a necessity. I see a United Nations that recognizes . . . 
the non-governmental organizations[’] revolution.”91 And NGOs, he 
added, will give “global civil society its rightful place as one of the pil-
lars of the international community in the twenty-first century.” 92 
Likewise, the sentiment of a “partnership” between global civil society 
and the United Nations figured in many speeches and activities of the 
world’s leading international NGOs, as they celebrated the undeniable 
achievements of the landmines ban campaign and took from that expe-
rience the conviction that they were indeed representatives and interme-
diaries for the peoples of the world.93 They would democratize foreign 
policy and international relations and bring the peoples of the world into 
the rarified chambers of the United Nations. And they would contribute 
to the erosion of sovereignty in favor of a progressive form of global go-
vernance that would have at its core a partnership between the institu-
tional UN, as the seat of global governance, and global civil society, 
which would intermediate on behalf of and represent the world’s 
peoples. 
V. AFTER SEATTLE: THE REACTION AGAINST GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
The critique was always implied in the conventional account: demo-
cratic legitimacy matters, and corporatist forms of intermediation and 
representation, even if actually true (a questionable assumption, as it 
turns out), are insufficient to yield the kind of legitimacy for global go-
vernance that it claims. Put another way, the UN and the international 
NGOs were locked in a sort-of ‘lovers’ embrace’—eyes only upon each 
other, each in pursuit of its own ideological goal, but finding in the other 
                                                                                                                            
and anodyne characterization is, let us be clear, an ideological move of the first order, 
albeit by elision. 
 91. Kofi Annan, Sec’y Gen. U.N., Address to World Civil Society Conference (Dec. 
8, 1999). 
 92. Id. One example among a great many, was Kofi Annan saying “global people-
power . . . is the best thing that has happened to [the United Nations] in a long time.” Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Maxwell Kerley, Achieving Zero New Victims of Landmines, U.N. 
CHRONICAL (2009). 
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the confirmation of its special status. The UN sought to be the seat of 
global governance—and international NGOs, recast as global civil socie-
ty, appeared to be able to give it the measure of legitimacy needed. The 
international NGOs, recast and confirmed by the UN as being interme-
diaries and representatives of the peoples of the world, thereby had an 
unquestioned seat at the table of power. Moreover, the NGOs had a place 
at the table that required less actual expertise and competence at some 
actual activity or mission than before, because, after all, the representa-
tives of the world’s peoples have a place at the table because they are 
representatives, not because of their technical skills or competences. It 
really was as though these two were lovers, each gratifying and confirm-
ing the other, eyes for each other and no one else—because, so far as 
each was concerned, each confirmed the worth of the other, without re-
gard for the world beyond. 
This love affair went on more or less unchallenged until an event that 
today (having now experienced 9/11, the Iraq war, the emergence of Al 
Qaeda and transnational jihadist terrorism, and much else besides) seems 
rather quaint. The event was rioting by anti-globalization protestors that 
brought to a crashing halt WTO trade talks in Seattle, December 1999. 
Anti-globalization protestors (with the active, profound assistance and 
coordination, and moral and material support of global civil society) took 
to the streets and forced the trade talks to shutdown.94 Very quickly, 
global business interests that had looked upon the global civil society 
movement with a sort of benign interest (seeing it in precisely the terms 
offered by it, as a sign of the maturation of a global society, a global de-
mos) began to question precisely those aspects that made the claim of 
global civil society special: its representativeness and its claims to inter-
mediate. But it was not merely global business interests that looked with 
profound dismay at what the rioters and their supporters had wrought—
the senior leadership of the UN, including Annan, saw this as a disastr-
ous development because, indeed, they genuinely saw free trade, if prop-
erly managed, as deeply in the interests of the world’s poor. 
Hithertofor, supporters of the idea of global civil society and global 
governance—so long as it included free trade—such as the Economist, 
began to raise serious questions about the elevated political and ideologi-
cal claims that intellectually transformed international NGOs into global 
                                                                                                                            
 94. Anup Shah, WTO Protests in Seattle, 1999, GLOBAL ISSUES (Feb. 18, 2001), 
available at http://www.globalissues.org/article/46/wto-protests-in-seattle-1999; WTO 
Meeting and Protests in Seattle (1999)—Part 2, HISTORYLINK.ORG, 
http://www.historylink.org/_content/printer_friendly/pf_output.cfm?file_id=9213 (last 
visited May 16, 2011). 
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civil society.95 The skepticism was easy enough to develop—all one had 
to ask was, who do these groups actually speak for, anyway?96 As David 
Rieff baldly put it, “So who elected the NGOs?”97 Governments in the 
developing world—the democratic among them desperate for free 
trade—acidly noted that these groups purported to speak for peoples but 
denied the legitimacy of their governments, even ones that had been de-
mocratically elected.98 The journalist Sebastian Mallaby conducted a cel-
ebrated—and reviled—study of the membership of one such NGO in 
Uganda that claimed to have the legitimacy to prevent a dam project with 
the capacity to bring electricity to vast numbers of people; the NGO in 
Uganda turned out to have twenty-five inscribed members.99 
The international NGOs, under attack and subjected to a wave of un-
familiar skepticism from the long supportive Western elite press, began 
to back away from the most extravagant claims to represent peoples and 
populations—at least when dealing with journalists. The head of Green-
peace UK, for example, gave interviews in which he denied claiming 
                                                                                                                            
 95. See, e.g., The Non-Governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratize, or Merely 
Disrupt, Global Governance?, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999; Sins of the Secular Mis-
sionaries, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000. 
 96. For example, the highly regarded policy scholar and former State Department 
official, Thomas Carothers, wrote an article imploring us to reevaluate what civil society 
means. He was not even referring to global civil society, but to the limitations of what 
one could expect from civil society in newly emerging democracies in such places as 
Eastern Europe. Thomas Carothers, Think Again: Civil Society, FOREIGN POL’Y MAG., 
Winter 1999–2000, at 18. 
 97. Rieff raised this charge at a conference on child-soldiers and then followed it up 
in a widely circulated article that was quickly picked up as a talking point by many critics 
of NGOs. David Rieff, Address at the Conference on the Landmines Campaign and In-
ternational Civil Society, Washington Coll. of Law, American Univ. (Feb. 27, 1998) 
[hereinafter Rieff, Address] (panel moderated by Kenneth Anderson); David Rieff, The 
False Dawn of Civil Society, THE NATION, Feb. 22, 1999 [hereinafter Rieff, False Dawn]. 
 98. Fareed Zakaria, then Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, found after contacting 
ten NGOs after the Seattle riots, that “most consisted of ‘three people and a fax’,” and 
expressed the concern that rich world “governments will listen too much to the loud mi-
nority” of first world activists and “neglect the fears of the silent majority” in the devel-
oping world who would benefit from activities not considered virtuous by the NGOs of 
the developed world. Justin Marozzi, Whose World is it, Anyway?, THE SPECTATOR, Aug. 
5, 2000. 
 99. SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD’S BANKER: A STORY OF FAILED STATES, 
FINANCIAL CRISES, AND THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 7–8 (2004). There is 
practically a cottage industry among NGO activists responding to Mallaby’s charges 
regarding the situation of this Ugandan dam. For a discussion of this debate, see, e.g., 
Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability Means—And Does Not Mean, 103 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 170, 170–71 (2009) (reviewing NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES & 
INNOVATIONS (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuijl eds., 2006)). 
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legitimacy to represent anyone except the members of the group itself.100 
Many other organizations adopted the same tack.101 Yet, outside the ve-
nues of the press, when it came to demanding privileges based on the 
exalted status of global civil society—places in the negotiations of trea-
ties and agreements and so on—the demands remained fundamentally 
unchanged. 
The institutional UN, for its part, reacted with uncertainty. On the one 
hand, the legitimating role envisioned for global civil society remained 
unchanged: who else was there to play it? On the other hand, Annan and 
his senior advisors, in the weeks and months following the Seattle de-
bacle, remonstrated openly with global civil society.102Annan, in particu-
lar, rather bravely—given that he had declared these groups to be his 
constituency—gave multiple speeches directly to NGO conferences and 
congresses in 2000, telling them flatly that they were wrong about eco-
nomic globalization and trade.103 The task before them, he said, was not 
to prevent globalization, but to make its fruits available to all—a plea to 
make globalization a positive sum, not a zero sum game.104 “We swim 
with the currents of our time,” Annan said, in one of the most cogent 
speeches of his career, delivered at the 2000 Millennium Forum of global 
civil society meeting at and with the UN, to an audience that, if not per-
sonally hostile to him, was broadly hostile to the idea.105 
Global civil society, it seemed, had overstated its claims and even po-
litically overplayed its hand. The collapse of the Seattle WTO trade talks 
badly damaged the global civil society movement with otherwise broadly 
sympathetic corporate, business, and many, many government interests, 
as well as intellectuals and policy experts. It was seen as unruly, anar-
chic, undisciplined, and often willing to tolerate street violence and thug-
                                                                                                                            
 100. Marozzi, supra note 98 (quoting Peter Melchett, Executive Director of Green-
peace UK: “Democratic governments are elected and have democratic legitimacy. Other 
organizations, such as Greenpeace, The Spectator and the Guardian, do not. We have the 
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 101. Alison Van Rooy collects and critiques some of this reaction. See VAN ROOY, 
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 103. See Kofi Annan, Sec’y Gen. of the U. N., Address at the Millennium Forum (May 
22, 2000) (transcript available at 
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gish language against economic globalization. In some respects the insti-
tutional UN pulled back from global civil society, feeling pressure from 
Member States. 
Yet to a large extent, global civil society continued to have a positive 
reception at the UN. This was particularly so of global civil society’s 
most presentable, upper-middle class, bourgeoisie emissaries—not the 
violent anarchists of the street, having a good time throwing stones at 
police and ransacking the McDonald’s,106 but instead the high-minded, 
respectful, respectable faces, those of large, serious, well-funded organi-
zations in the human rights world, development, and humanitarian com-
munities. 
Global civil society (its glamour a bit faded as the bearer of global 
democratic legitimacy, but the only available suitor for the role) re-
mained a “partner” to the UN, in Annan’s parlance, while nonetheless 
receiving a distinctly chillier reception. Because, for the UN, the under-
lying issue of legitimacy remained unchanged and its possible choices 
constrained. The institutional UN and its leadership—the “modernizers” 
in the Secretary General’s offices among the organization’s senior execu-
tives—remained convinced that the UN-destined-for-global-governance 
had to find a way around the limited and limiting legitimacy conferred 
narrowly and jealously by the Member States and reach directly to the 
populations of the world as the UN’s legitimating constituency. This be-
came especially clear in the discussions and arguments between the ‘tra-
ditionalists’ and the ‘modernizers’ in the Secretary General’s offices in 
the policy run-up in the early 2000s to Kofi Annan’s ill-starred UN 
Reform Summit in 2005.107 The UN and global civil society—lovers, 
still, but no longer out of a sense of true love—each giving legitimacy 
and countenance to the other. The intellectual high water mark had been 
crossed and critical intellectuals were mounting attacks upon the history 
and concept of the very idea of global civil society, let alone that it might 
confer authority upon the UN as the representative and intermediary of 
the world’s peoples to their global government.108 
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 107. Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations, and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L 
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878 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:3 
VI. THE UN’S RETURN TO THE MEMBER STATES AND KOFI ANNAN’S 
RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL POST 9/11 
Post 9/11, the debate over the nature and status of global civil society 
within the global system seemed somehow childish and silly. A form of 
non-state actor had made its presence known, but its claims, demands, 
origins, ideologies, zealotries, and fanaticisms had very little to do with 
the non-state actors that made up global civil society. The Seattle pro-
tests—and beyond Seattle, anywhere the IMF or World Bank, or WTO 
might hold meetings— all seemed like a form of recreation for bored 
Western young people after 9/11, throwing a few stones at policemen 
and burning a Macdonald’s, events that were all quickly forgotten as 
Western adolescent games when instead the twin towers came down. But 
even serious, respectable NGOs found that they no longer occupied at-
tention in the way that they had even following the Seattle debacle. In-
ternational NGOs were suddenly swept off the board as political actors. 
Global civil society, as an intellectual construct for conveying legitima-
cy, was suddenly irrelevant. The nation-state was back. If the UN wanted 
a role to play, it would pay attention to nation-states and above all to the 
Security Council.109 
As for the NGOs, they could be the camp-followers of the nation-states 
as the Western alliance went to war, or they could stay home. Or they 
could issue press releases and studies and reports and statements, as they 
preferred or not, but they were no longer at the center of attention. It was 
as though global civil society had been, for the UN, a lovely but tempo-
rary dalliance with a mistress; but when reality intruded, the lover rushed 
back to his wife, and so the attentions of the UN leadership returned to 
the Security Council. This was so even though some of the leading 
NGOs, in the human rights field especially, found their work more in the 
public eye than ever, as the war on terror began to unfold following 9/11. 
The run-up to the Iraq war that began in 2003 emphasized even more the 
preeminence of nation-states and the central importance of the Security 
Council, especially for the UN senior leadership.110 When the questions 
of war and peace were on the table in ways that directly involved the 
world’s great powers, then the NGOs and global civil society seemed 
small fry indeed. This was so despite the efforts of global civil society to 
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mobilize large numbers of people in protests against the Iraq war in 
many countries.111 
But the response to the war on terror and the Iraq war illustrated some-
thing that everyone had always known to be true, but which was always 
glossed over by the apparently politically neutral language of global civil 
society: although in principle, institutions of civil society can include a 
wide variety of political orientations and, in democratic societies, do, in 
fact, in the international community the term is reserved for politically 
‘progressive’ organizations, defined in broad terms as a left wing politics 
and an orientation toward global governance over merely democratic 
sovereign governance.112 The legion academic literature on global civil 
society largely assumes that it is about the left wing Human Rights 
Watch and Greenpeace, not the pro-life efforts of the Evangelical Chris-
tian and Catholic Churches, and that it is committed to precisely what the 
institutional UN sought from it—an a priori commitment to the idea of 
global governance, a preference for the international over the merely na-
tional.113 
The covert narrowness of the received view, however, with its politi-
cally constrained but apparently neutral view, was not exposed by the 
presence of some dissident international NGOs that defied the consen-
sus—the National Rifle Association and its global affiliates, for exam-
ple.114 It was exposed, instead, by the emergence of transnational, non-
state actors of great power and, as it turned out, dismayingly wide appeal 
in the Muslim world, at least for a time, that owed nothing intellectually 
or politically to the concept of civil society in relation to the international 
system. Put another way, after a post-Cold War decade in which global 
governance was pursued by the UN and global civil society as “interna-
tional law,” it turned out that there was a growing form of transnational 
law, under the radar screen of global civil society and international or-
ganizations equally, but with far greater weight, impress, and conse-
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quence. It turned out to be not international law as such, but shari’a.115 
One could plausibly argue that shari’a law has a considerable claim to be 
the genuine growth industry in transborder, global law. 
This should give pause, one might think, to democratic liberal progres-
sives who somehow automatically favor the transborder over the merely 
national, the international and global over the merely parochial sove-
reignty of the nation-state. That this largely does not says something 
about how liberal, or not, “liberal internationalism” actually is today. 
Global law might indeed grow, but not necessarily in a liberal direction. 
The reason this does not appear to give concern to progressive forces of 
global civil society is simply that these forces, like the UN itself, have 
largely given up the dream of an international order based around liberal, 
secular, neutral principles that separate out private belief from public 
conduct in the public square, and have instead embraced religious and 
ethnic communalism and multiculturalism, rather than the neutral liberal-
ism of individual rights and liberties, as the ideal for managing conflicts 
among religious and ethnic communities.116 What is the actual world in 
which the legitimacy of democratic nation-states is systematically de-
graded in favor of a shallow cosmopolitanism, promoted by global civil 
society, embraced by de-racinated academics, the media, and interna-
tional institutions, and all for the sake of the supposed abstract virtue of 
governance at the global level? It is a world that in fact empowers simul-
taneously sub-national and supra-national religious and ethnic groups. Is 
that a more liberal world because it is more shallowly cosmopolitan at 
the global level?117 
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Much of what we are pleased to call global governance operates at the 
subnational level to empower forces of illiberalism over liberal democra-
cy, while yet handing to them the keys to liberalism’s forms, rhetoric, 
and processes in the form of trumping rights over attempts by liberal-
ism’s institutions to rein them in like any other group in society. It is as 
though liberalism had no substantive moral, political, legal, or historical 
commitments—a strange position indeed for idealists and ideologists 
who otherwise count themselves as “progressive” and therefore practical-
ly committed to some theory of moral progress in history. And as though 
“liberalism” were merely a temporary and contingent commitment to 
“revealed preferences” that might, for all we know, point the way to 
communal governance by religious authorities. It is a mistake to confuse 
proud liberalism with this shallow cosmopolitanism.118 
Why a world of transborder, multiculturally-‘managed’ cousin loyal-
ties, however, would be a better place—merely because it endorses 
‘global’ governance—than a liberal one based around individual human 
rights and democratic participation in religiously and ethnically neutral 
states is far from self-evident. Nonetheless, it appears to be what global 
civil society and the institutional UN have endorsed as the new global 
ethic in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war. Anyone doubting that propo-
sition might take the opportunity to attend the sessions of the “reformed” 
UN Human Rights Council in Geneva and see how much of its agenda is 
devoted systematically to replacing liberal concepts of free expression 
with impeccably multiculturalist ideals of religious communalism, be-
ginning with the proposition that no religion, or at least Islam, shall ever 
be offended by contrary speech.119 
                                                                                                                            
global and transnational theory of governance is best understood not as the elaboration of 
a theory of global governance, but as a manifesto for setting out a global market for ex-
pert elite free agents, those whose Global New Class interests are as real as any other 
class in history, but which are facilitated by the dismantling of barriers at the national 
level, because they live, work, and play in the jet stream. I have discussed the New Class 
theory behind all this, in the context particularly of lawyers’ roles in the global economy. 
See Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1062 (1996). 
 118. This being, in effect, the (very) short response to PETER SPIRO, BEYOND 
CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2007). 
 119. The indispensable source of information on a daily basis is UN WATCH, 
http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1277549/k.BF70/Home.htm (last vi-
sited Mar. 17, 2011); see also Brett D. Schaefer, Commentary: Free Speech? Not at the 
U.N. Human Rights Council, THE HERITAGE FOUND., Mar. 29, 2007. 
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VII. WHAT NEXT FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, THE UN, AND GLOBAL 
CIVIL SOCIETY? 
Global governance, as a federal world under the UN, as a global con-
stitutional order, as a political project to correspond to economic globali-
zation of goods, capital, and increasingly labor and services, is stalled. 
But it is stalled in a peculiar way. The UN is immobilized in a cul-de-sac 
in which it can neither move forward meaningfully toward that political 
goal, nor give up that overarching political goal in favor of something 
more modest, achievable, or frankly useful. Its legitimacy is peculiarly 
linked to the vision of its glorious future as the seat of global governance, 
and it seemingly cannot get on with something more functionally impor-
tant because then the limited legitimacy that it does have is also at stake. 
It is a little like the exiled queen who has lost everything, except the 
claim to the throne, which justifies everything else and yet which prec-
ludes her from doing anything different other than being pretender to the 
throne. 
There are, in other words, useful, functional, greyly technocratic things 
the UN might be doing well—but which it finds difficult to undertake 
because, in a certain way, doing them would be beneath its dignity. 
Doing them would constitute an acknowledgment that the UN will never 
really be the Parliament of Man, at least not in the grand and glorious 
sense of global governance. And because of that commitment to the fu-
ture, too, other actors are skeptical about entrusting the UN with any-
thing they really care about—peacekeeping in some forsaken failed-state 
hellhole, yes; replacing ICANN with the UN to regulate the Internet, 
no—because they understand the deep tendencies of the organization to 
politicization of even apparently routine issues.120 
Unsurprisingly, the global civil society movement is caught in precise-
ly the same cul-de-sac. It turns out to be both unable to confer the legiti-
macy that the UN’s ideas of global governance require, but also not able 
to act as “representatives” and “intermediaries” for the peoples of the 
world, at least not compared to nation-states. The more savvy among 
them have moved to a two-sided, uneasy strategy of publicly abandoning 
the intellectual pretensions of global civil society and appearing, public-
ly, to beat a retreat to just being NGOs again. Beat a retreat, that is, from 
making such grandiose claims of representativeness and have gone back 
to asserting—rightly or wrongly, true or false—their expertise and com-
                                                                                                                            
 120. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres J. Gallo, Pondering the Politics of Private Pro-
cedures: The Case of ICANN, 4 INFO. SOC’Y J. L. & POL’Y 345 (2008) (a generally sym-
pathetic article about the idea of UN agency regulation but giving a scrupulously useful 
account of those who are not). 
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petence as reasons why anyone should pay attention to them. At the same 
time, however, international NGOs build on earlier success in creating an 
atmosphere of “partnership” among global civil society, international 
institutions, and like-minded states (precisely the formulation drawn out 
of the success of the landmines campaign) in order to demand a ‘seat at 
the table.’ The old, and one might have thought, discredited, corporatist 
claim of representativeness and intermediation continues to operate with-
in the more limited precincts of international organizations—not at the 
level of deliberations of the Security Council, but in the myriad lower 
level issues that are the natural fodder of interest groups that have found 
a way to ally themselves with the UN’s institutional interests, and to call 
it “representativeness” when that suits and “expertise” when it does 
not.121 
                                                                                                                            
 121. Because this Essay was largely completed before the appearance of David Gart-
ner’s exceptionally fine argument in favor of drawing the NGOs into many more things 
in the processes of public international organizations, I will not try to respond to it in 
detail. See David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595 
(2010). On this particular issue, Gartner argues that the resistance on grounds of over-
claiming legitimacy by NGOs-as-Global Civil Society is alarmist and overstated; what is 
the harm in inviting knowledgeable NGOs to give input in some formalized way in ve-
nues, such as World Bank or UN organs for particular activities, in which they might 
have much expertise to offer? 
  Part of the response though, is that it does not actually work this way. Having sat 
through many NGO strategy meetings, the aim was always to use the seat at the table of 
negotiations in order to ratchet up legitimacy to the point of being able to assert that 
“our” place was no longer discretionary, because we “represented” people. As for exper-
tise, as noted earlier—harking back to Martin Shapiro’s powerful critique of experts and 
enthusiasts that even Anne-Marie Slaughter, no sovereigntist defender herself, found 
persuasive—in many of the matters under discussion, there is no purely neutral expertise,  
but rather it always melds with prescriptive agendas, quite sincerely held. See supra note 
51. The act of being able to intervene in the discussion and make statements in the course 
of negotiation of a statement or declaration, a treaty text, whatever it might be, is indeed a 
real form of influence; if it were not, the NGOs would not bother. But it is influence both 
in that act, but also in the process of legitimation for which, in my experience at least, 
international organizations and states that permit this expect a sort of broad reciprocal 
legitimation in return, and why not? 
  The other part of the response to this critique that NGOs really are not looking to 
make claims of representativeness that they do not bear is that they are not making them 
now because it is strategically imprudent to do so, but in fact they do regard themselves 
as representatives in some grand moral sense, and will assert it if it becomes strategically 
and politically plausible down the road. There is a curious bait and switch that goes on 
here—when the NGOs are called on their ideological pretensions of “representativeness” 
in the form of the claim to be global civil society and all the massive ideological connota-
tions it brings, there is an immediate retreat back to a touchingly modest, demure, sub-
missive mien—who, us? But as soon as the pressure is off, then the claims to legitimacy 
ratchet back up—the pretender to the throne never really stops being the pretender. 
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The ideological argument over global civil society will presumably re-
sonate in the academic and NGO literature for years to come. The model 
worked out in the 1990s for global civil society has continues to operate, 
with some surface modifications. In order to accommodate new sensitivi-
ties, the NGOs are no longer announced as “partners” but instead as 
“norm entrepreneurs” and “transnational advocacy networks.”122 The 
new terminology tends to obscure what is the same—call it by these 
terms, and so seek to defang the problems of representation, intermedia-
tion, and corporatism, but the moving actor is still an ideologically con-
ceived global civil society. The academic literature will find itself enth-
ralled for some years yet with analyzing how global civil society is draw-
ing new norms in the international market in ideas and so democratizing 
and opening the “international community.” The academic activist-
scholars have difficulty taking on board that this supposed “openness” is 
actually and essentially a closed legitimation-circle between global civil 
society and international organizations. Calling it “entrepreneurship” 
obscures as much as it illuminates what is the overarching issue of the 
United Nations and the ideal of global governance—the on-going, dec-
ades-long legitimation crisis. 
Yet a new and intellectually powerful assortment of scholars—
impeccably liberal internationalists, wedded to global governance, but 
not at all wedded to the sanctity of global civil society—has already 
moved beyond the idea that global governance can or should be sought 
through global civil society. They are almost certainly right in viewing 
the global civil society movement as an element, but not the most com-
pelling one, in creating global governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bene-
dict Kingsbury, and Kal Raustiala, among others, are all committed to 
some form of global governance, but none suggests that its legitimacy 
would come about through global civil society.123 As Slaughter said flat-
                                                                                                                            
  Gartner, in my view, offers the “aw shucks, it’s just us NGOs,” but does not ad-
dress the large body of material in which the “aw shucks” view is overtaken by the “we, 
the peoples of the world” view. What in the internal workings of the NGOs have changed 
their self-perception, and why should it change? Put a different way, Gartner needs to 
explain less why Anderson is wrong, and more why John Keane, the leading 1990s theor-
ist of global civil society in all its legitimate glory, and the one at that point embraced by 
“global civil society,” is wrong and show that it has actually been repudiated as the inter-
nal ideological stance of the NGO community in its heart of hearts. All that said, Gart-
ner’s article is an impressive work, and one of the best defenses of a certain role of NGOs 
in international organizations. 
 122. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 3. 
 123. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 51; see also Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & 
Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law (Inst. Int’l L. & Just., 
Working Paper 2004/1, 2004); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Coopera-
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ly, global governance needs forms of legitimacy that only states, and 
their agencies, can provide; she elaborates a form of governance that 
goes far beyond the idea of robust multilateralism that this Essay has 
suggested, but one which is distinctly cool to the idea of genuine legiti-
macy coming from global civil society.124 
Benedict Kingsbury’s project of global administrative law skips over 
the very problem of political legitimacy altogether—a troubling jump, to 
be sure—in favor of purely technocratic legitimacy achieved simply by 
technocratic competence, whether through networked agencies among 
governments or networks including relevant corporate or NGO actors, 
what matters is competence and accomplishment, not political legitimacy 
in the abstract.125 This essentially technocratic account is noteworthy for 
the fact that nowhere does it refer to international NGOs as “global civil 
society,” and it prefers to treat private actors as including both NGOs and 
corporate actors because, in the end, what matters is who has genuinely 
expert knowledge and who is able to prove competence.126 It is an ac-
count coolly indifferent to the heated romanticism of the NGO claims, 
for and against, a certain shrug of the shoulders as if to say, it is nearly 
2010 and those arguments are all so . . . 90s. 
There are, in my estimation, serious problems with these various alter-
natives. In the first place, the one thing that the troubled discourse of 
global civil society and the UN is right about is that political legitimacy 
does matter, and it cannot be achieved for the purposes and activities for 
which the UN has declared itself fit and fitting on a purely technocratic 
basis. Global civil society cannot convey that legitimacy; but it was not 
wrong to insist that it matters and is not reducible to bureaucracy, no 
matter how competent. That said, they, the theorists of networks of bu-
reaucrats and judges and what, in a more adequately theorized system, 
would come to be known as the globalized “wholly-administered socie-
ty”—not global civil society, not NGO norm entrepreneurship, not trans-
national advocacy networks—represent the cutting edge of theory of 
global governance and, by extension, the emerging conceptual poverty of 
the role of international NGOs.127 
                                                                                                                            
tion: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2002). The next move in this ongoing debate, I suppose, will be that international 
law theorists will begin to realize that they have possibly placed too much faith in net-
work theory. 
 124. SLAUGHTER, supra note 51, at 8–11 
 125. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 123. 
 126. See generally id. 
 127. The “wholly-administered society” refers to a concept developed as part of New 
Class theory among the editors of Telos in the 1970s and 1980s. It is a discussion for 
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In any case, however, the world at the time of this writing appears to 
be moving toward a multipolarity that raises a whole different set of is-
sues both practical and ethical with respect to international NGOs, public 
international institutions, and global governance. What happens when it 
becomes clear that the superpower, while militarily still the superpower, 
does not have unlimited resources and powers to be able to impose its 
will on China, Russia, or such “resource extraction authoritarian states” 
as Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, etc., at least within their own spheres 
of influence and local geographies? Whether that condition will continue 
to accelerate or not is unclear and depends on so many contingencies—
shifts in oil prices, a US that loses interest in offering a global security 
guarantee or even a NATO one, a China that fails to continue achieving 
legitimacy through growth and sets off serious internal unrest, etc. Yet 
were this trend to continue, many will celebrate that as the advent of a 
more “equal,” more “just,” better world. Many will also likely come to 
regret it, were that truly to come to pass, however, at least if they also 
count themselves fans of global governance. Why? 
A genuinely multipolar world is, as David Rieff has noted, not a coop-
erative world but, almost by definition, a competitive one.128 In that kind 
of world, states are more important than they ever were when they were 
under the hegemony of the United States, and there is less room, not 
more, for cooperation. Competition is not limited to the issues of deep 
conflict—Georgia, the Taiwan straits—but spills over into seemingly 
unrelated matters, such as whether the authoritarians of the Security 
Council, Russia, and China, will begin reflexively to oppose initiatives in 
parts of the world—failed states, for example—in which they have no 
deep interests, simply for the sake of putting pressure on initiatives spon-
sored by the rest. In other words, there is a hold-up value on otherwise 
unrelated issues—countries at the UN, after all, thrive on it as a form of 
rent-seeking. Global governance does not have a real place in this world, 
at least not global governance conceived in its ‘high church’ sense as a 
federal world under the UN, with the Charter as its constitution. In place 
of governance, the UN becomes what, on a more realist view, it always 
was—at best, the talking shop of the nations. 
                                                                                                                            
another day, but we are not so very far from the need for a globalized theory of the New 
Class, and the wholly-administered, professionalized-yet-marketized society that Telos 
debated several decades ago, in order to understand in a genuinely radical way the con-
tent of extant ideologies of global governance. The memory of Paul Piccone lives. 
 128. David Rieff, Concerts and Silly Seasons, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Feb. 23, 2007), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/concerts_4380.jsp. Rieff is 
here criticizing Michael Lind’s idea of a “concert of power.” MICHAEL LIND, THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF STRATEGY 171–88 (2006). 
2011] "ACCOUNTABILITY" AS "LEGITIMACY" 887 
One could argue, perhaps, that NGOs in such a world become more, 
rather than less, influential, but frankly, the opposite argument seems far 
more persuasive. Global civil society and global governance achieve 
their maximal ideological appeal and, indeed, political influence when 
the basic security of much of the planet is taken care of. And that guaran-
tee is provided not by the UN, with the great powers in much greater 
conflict and (even without great power conflicts as such) the free-rider 
problems endemic to the collective security system, but by a relatively 
benign hegemon that, in pursuit of its own very broadly conceived secu-
rity interests, a combination of its ideals and interests, carries along much 
of the industrialized world’s security interests in train. The cause of 
global governance, and partnership with global civil society, looks much 
less attractive when security itself is an issue; moral exhortation is a 
lovely but superfluous attribute when what is needed are the big batta-
lions. The NGOs might consider prayer to Kant in the name of the cate-
gorical imperative, then, that the US not lose interest or capacity or un-
dertake a calculation of fundamental tradeoffs as to the costs of being the 
hegemon: the global order that the superpower underpins is the one in 
which the NGOs swim as fishes in the sea.129 
It is less clear whether a competitive, multipolar world favors or disfa-
vors global governance conceived as a more limited, more technocratic 
project. Jettisoning the grand political project of political representative-
ness and intermediation and legitimacy in any grand sense cannot hurt in 
such a world. The attempt to bring together technocrats rather than poli-
ticians, and seek only such legitimacy as is required to solve particular 
problems and presume only such legitimacy as is required—only to make 
a limited set of global trains run on time for the sake, especially, of very 
poor people about whom no else really very much cares—seems like it 
must be less disfavored, at least, even in a competitive multipolar world. 
Yet the problem of hold-up value in projects and tasks globally that 
seem, on their own, to have little to do with competitive great powers, 
does not go away. Still, there is much to recommend the approach—
provided of course that it never gets above itself and begins to believe 
that the legitimacy of technocrats for discrete functions can somehow be 
built up into some ideologically grander structure. 
There is no grander structure. Coordination among democratic sove-
reigns in robust multilateralism is the most that can, and should, be 
                                                                                                                            
 129. I address these questions in blunt language in Kenneth Anderson, Paul Kennedy’s 
The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (Wash. 
Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2008–70, 2008) (book review), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265833. 
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sought in the way of political globalization. It does not satisfy the vast 
imaginations for those that only the grandiosity of the Parliament of Man 
can satisfy. It promotes the UN-of-Less-Visibility and not the UN-of-
Rock-Stars. It is resolutely state-centric and sovereign. It does not give 
NGOs a special place in the global firmament and certainly grants them 
no special legitimating authority. Their ethical status does not include 
representation or intermediation—something that ought to be understood 
within and without the United Nations, because it has implications for 
how the UN ought to treat them: but, then, that would require that the 
UN take account of how it treats itself. Robust multilateralism, for its 
part, as a model of governance, at least has the possibility of effective-
ness in particular matters for particular people and particular places: tak-
en together, enough of them, they after all make up the globe. The ethics 
of global governance, in other words, ought finally to include the ac-
knowledgment that while there are international NGOs, there is no global 
civil society. 
CONCLUSION: FROM LEGITIMACY, BACK TO ACCOUNTABILITY 
This conclusion is not an argument that the NGOs ought to pack up 
and go home. On the contrary, it is a plea for the NGOs to find ways to 
discipline themselves and their ideological pretensions, so as to remain 
useful as experts and, yes, even as enthusiasts and advocates for their 
causes. To that extent they can function like civil society in domestic 
democratic society. Concomitantly, they need to give up the claim—
really give it up, not merely strategically set it aside for down the road—
that they represent anyone or that they deserve attention as intermediaries 
for the peoples of the world. It misconceives the nature of the role but, 
more crucially, makes an illegitimate power play for status that is not, in 
fact, legitimate for the ends that they, and public international organiza-
tions, have in mind. But to do so, the NGOs have to give up the whole 
ideological apparatus of global civil society, and in so doing, give up the 
love affair with public international organizations. 
That is a hard thing for the NGO community to do. It requires inten-
tional self-discipline and self-awareness of a kind that NGOs and social 
movements, like any other institution, find hard to achieve—precisely 
because it swims against the apparently compelling and irresistible tide 
of strategic behavior that magically confirms one’s highest ideological 
self-perception. Modesty is the hardest institutional virtue for NGOs. The 
ICRC has the right set of modesty-inducing incentives insofar as it sees 
itself as constrained around an institutional competence and “right to par-
ticipate” of “bare rationality” in situations of dire humanitarian emergen-
cy; less so insofar as it sees itself as the forward-looking, progressive 
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voice of international humanitarian law.130 But overall, the ICRC’s ratio-
nales are self-constraining in a way that few other organizations or new 
social movements in the world of international NGOs are; on the con-
trary, they lead them to positive feedback mechanisms that in turn lead 
directly to the ideology of global civil society and a legitimation-affair 
with public international organizations. 
Moreover, it is made more difficult by a set of social dynamics that 
have not been explored at all in this Essay—the relationship not only 
with public international organizations, but with the funders of these 
movements, the philanthropists and foundations that set the priorities, 
establish the incentives and disincentives, and which represent a whole 
other set of social and economic pressures upon NGOs and social 
movements. If the Global New Class elites are about global markets un-
fettered to allow them to sell their expert services without regard to bor-
ders, national loyalties or identities (save for China), and an account of 
class interest that thus far seems to have escaped much analytic notice, 
then the great philanthropists likewise have not been studied with any 
deeply critical eye. 
One place to begin might be to assume that they are not like the Global 
New Class—those who have already won in that arena—and that their 
motives are no longer those of money and profit, but instead “glory,” the 
quality of individuals seeking something grander and longer lived than 
liquid capital. One might begin, then, by thinking of them within histori-
cal and social traditions that take glory seriously—does not a Soros, for 
example, at least on the global philanthropic stage, seem less today like a 
plutocrat and more like a genuine “baron,” in the formal sense of medie-
valism? A Gates or even a Clinton—feudal lords in a world with no 
clearly defined king—seeking not money and not even power exactly, 
but . . . gloire? And around whom the NGOs clump as courtiers, flatter-
ers, or perhaps peasants and serfs? Human Rights Watch has an annual 
budget of some $44 million. For those of us who have ever engaged in 
international NGO fundraising, it is an amount that is frankly staggering 
in absolute terms for the NGO world that does not benefit from govern-
ment funds. Is there no “critical political economy” to be elaborated here, 
no sternly critical and unsentimental ‘public choice’ account to be given 
of funders and fundees? 
This then leads us, at long last, back to the question of accountability. 
The foregoing, after all, said it was about accountability, but then took up 
a lengthy disquisition instead about legitimacy. What is the relationship? 
                                                                                                                            
 130. See generally David P. Forsythe, The ICRC: A Unique Humanitarian Protagon-
ist, 89 INT’L R. RED CROSS 63 (2007). 
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It is not a complicated one, and can be stated simply and by way of con-
clusion. 
The problem of legitimacy as it has been set forth here, both for NGOs 
and for public international organizations, is that their mutual intertwin-
ing leads to claims of legitimacy that are inflated and premised upon 
claims of legitimacy—democracy, representation, intermediation—that 
are simply untrue. A false, or inflated, or unsustainable claim of legiti-
macy, however, is a dangerous thing and particularly when it involves 
institutional actors mutually legitimating each other. It is dangerous inso-
far as anyone actually relies upon it, because the claim might eventually 
turn out to be worthless and a bad thing for those who relied upon it as a 
source of strength or protection—peacekeepers who invite reliance by 
the local population, but then make their own decisions to withdraw, for 
example. 
But it is particularly problematic for the idea of accountability, for ei-
ther NGOs or public international organizations. This faux-legitimacy 
invites these institutions to believe that their presumed legitimacy—
derived by assiduously consulting each other—is accountability, at least 
in the external sense. Whereas David Rieff’s insouciant question, “So 
who elected the NGOs?”,131 remains as salient as ever, the claim of legi-
timacy allows the question of external accountability—to whom does 
one account for the positions one takes, the policies one urges, the 
courses of action one demands?—to be answered by saying, we represent 
vast, but naturally silent, populations of the world. Our accountability is 
to them, if anyone—and they are . . . silent. And does not silence give 
consent? 
This is not, to say the least, accountability of civil society in a domestic 
democratic society, in which external legitimacy is automatically trig-
gered by the fact that everyone will raise their hands, independent of the 
mediation of the civil society actors. There is no similar reality-check in 
the form of accountability for NGO actors who, in asserting themselves 
as global civil society, serve as their own gate-keepers. That is the fun-
damental problem of legitimacy and the accountability of international 
NGOs in a world of public international organizations. Modesty, it turns 
out, is a very hard thing. ∗ 
                                                                                                                            
 131. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
∗One does not usually dedicate journal essays, but this one is to the memory of Paul Pic-
cone, founding editor of Telos, who many years ago introduced me to the social theory of 
the New Class. 
